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 Marriage, Fundamental Premises, and the California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa Supreme Courts 
Monte Neil Stewart, Jacob D. Briggs, and Julie Slater 
The highest courts in California, Connecticut, and Iowa recently 
held that the constitutional norm of equality requires the redefinition of 
marriage from “the union of a man and a woman” to “the union of 
any two persons.” The argument leading to that holding, like all 
arguments, proceeds from premises that the argument does not prove but 
that serve as the starting point for reasoning. Those premises range from 
the nature of contemporary American marriage to the equivalence of 
the pre- and post-redefinition marriage institutions, to the social costs, 
if any, resulting from redefinition, and to marriage’s relationship with 
other social institutions such as law and religion. 
This Article critically examines the common fundamental premises 
underlying the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions. That 
critical examination leads to serious questions regarding those premises’ 
validity. Indeed, that examination demonstrates their falsity. At the 
same time, it clarifies their materiality; that is, it shows that, but for the 
cases’ fundamental premises, no line of judicial reasoning can lead to 
their holding. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every argument proceeds from one or more premises that the 
argument does not prove. These “fundamental premises” serve as 
the starting point for reasoning. As every judicial opinion is an 
argument for a conclusion or holding, each has its own fundamental 
premises. That a judicial opinion’s fundamental premises are 
unproven is not necessarily a bad thing. Where their validity is 
universally (or perhaps even just widely) accepted in the relevant 
discourse community, these fundamental premises save time by 
focusing attention where sensibly it ought to be, on the court’s 
reasoning leading to its holding. Moreover, some premises are 
unprovable, as are their respective antitheses, and if litigation is to be 
the means of resolution, judicial reasoning must start somewhere in 
order for actual cases and controversies to be resolved.1  
False or otherwise invalid fundamental premises, however, are a 
bad thing. When an argument employs false fundamental premises 
there is very high probability that the reasoning proceeding from 
them, no matter how logical or coherent that reasoning may be 
 
 1. Where relevant and material premises and their antitheses are unprovable, an 
important question may be whether litigation, rather than democratic processes, is a defensible 
means of resolution. See, e.g., Robert T. Miller, Same-Sex Marriage, the Courts, and the People, 
On the Square, FIRST THINGS (June 12, 2008), http://www.firstthings.com/ 
onthesquare/?p=1091.  
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itself, will lead to false or otherwise invalid holdings, the kind of 
holdings that reasonable people cannot, indeed must not, respect.  
This Article critically examines fundamental premises of three 
particular judicial opinions addressing the marriage issue2: the 
California Supreme Court’s majority opinion in In re Marriage 
Cases,3 the Connecticut Supreme Court’s majority opinion in 
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,4 and the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s unanimous opinion in Varnum v. Brien.5 These three cases 
answer the question of whether constitutional norms require the 
redefinition of marriage from the union of a man and a woman to 
the union of any two persons. 
The plaintiffs in the three cases (all same-sex couples) invoked 
the liberty and equality provisions of their respective state 
constitutions in support of their claim to a right to a state-sanctioned 
marriage.6 Despite some variety in their approaches,7 all three 
opinions hold that their respective state constitutions mandate such a 
redefinition because of a constitutional norm of equality8 and do so 
with similar analyses.9 Following the federal model, each of the three 
opinions analyze the impugned laws’ creation of suspect 
classifications,10 the adequacy of the state interests asserted in 
justification of the classifications,11 and the appropriate level of 
 
 2. Although this Article does not discuss Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), Perry is clearly built upon the same premises as the three decisions 
examined in depth. 
 3. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (Proposition 8), as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 
P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 4. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 5. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 6. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 403–04; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412–13; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 872–73. 
 7. For example, the California court also based its mandate on a lengthy discussion of 
the fundamental right to marry. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 419–35; see also infra Part 
III.B.2.b.  
 8. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435–52; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 481–82; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 906–07. 
 9. Only the California decision analyzed the personal liberty interest. Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d at 419–33. This Article addresses that analysis in some detail below in relation to the 
most consequential fundamental premise. See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
 10. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441–42; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 422–23; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 882–84. 
 11. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 446–52; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476–81; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 897–904. 
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judicial scrutiny.12 Each held that the impugned laws did indeed 
create and treat differently two relevant classes: otherwise qualified 
man-woman couples who desire to marry versus otherwise qualified 
same-sex couples with the same desire. The Connecticut and Iowa 
opinions held that such a classification warranted heightened but not 
strict judicial scrutiny;13 the California opinion, however, held that 
strict scrutiny was warranted.14 All three opinions deemed the state 
interests proffered insufficient to justify the differently treated 
classes.15  
Examination of the fundamental premises common to each of 
the three opinions, however, leads to serious questions regarding 
their validity and even demonstrates their falsity. It also reveals the 
materiality of these false premises; that is, it shows that, but for the 
fundamental premises, no line of judicial reasoning can lead to the 
redefinition holding.  
These are bold claims but valid ones, as the following sections 
show. Part II begins with the first and most consequential 
fundamental premise—that marriage is nothing more than what the 
“narrow description” depicts it to be and therefore does not as a 
matter of fact have those characteristics ascribed to it by the 
competing “broad description.” This Part’s analysis demonstrates the 
defects of the narrow description and largely validates the broad 
description. Part III explores the fundamental premises underlying 
the three opinions’ various deployments of the “no-downside” 
argument. The no-downside argument is simply that the legal 
redefinition of marriage will have little or no adverse effects on 
important social goods and other valued interests. In the process, 
Part III demonstrates that those fundamental premises range from 
probably false to certainly false. Part IV summarizes the fundamental 
premises and shows their materiality to the three opinions’ mandate 
that marriage must be redefined from the union of a man and a 
woman to the union of any two persons. Part V concludes with 
 
 12. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 436–44; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426–76; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 885–96; see also Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. 
FAM. L. 11, 26–31 (2004), available at http://marriagelawfoundation.org/publications/ 
JRM.pdf [hereinafter Stewart, Redefinition]. 
 13. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896. 
 14. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441–443. 
 15. Id. at 451; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 435; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 904. 
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thoughts on intellectual competence and honesty in the context of 
those three opinions.  
II. THE FIRST AND MOST CONSEQUENTIAL FUNDAMENTAL 
PREMISE 
To begin with, each of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa 
opinions inevitably runs up against and either directly or indirectly 
addresses or evades the question of what marriage actually is. The 
California majority opinion initially encounters the question in its 
discourse on the right to marry.16 The Connecticut majority opinion 
and the Iowa opinion deal briefly with the question during the 
threshold analysis of whether the plaintiffs are “similarly situated” for 
purposes of equal protection.17 This important question then 
repeatedly resurfaces throughout the California, Connecticut, and 
Iowa opinions. A fundamental premise underlies the analysis found 
in each opinion, a premise that may not be openly stated but is 
critically necessary to each opinion’s conclusions. That fundamental 
premise is this: contemporary American marriage is nothing more 
than what the “narrow description,” or “close personal relationship” 
model, depicts it to be.  
A. The Narrow Description of Marriage 
The narrow description is the description of contemporary 
American marriage advanced by virtually all proponents of the 
redefinition of marriage—whether judges, academics, lawyers, 
politicians, or otherwise. Certainly in the numerous cases since the 
beginning of the organized and strategic effort to redefine marriage 
by judicial mandate (which started in Hawaii in 199118), proponents 
have uniformly advanced the narrow description as a complete and 
accurate depiction of contemporary marriage.19 Those proponents’ 
 
 16. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399–400. 
 17. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882–84. 
 18. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993); see William C. Duncan, The 
Litigation to Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623, 630–33 
(2003) (discussing Baehr, 852 P.2d 44).  
 19. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“[I]t 
is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another . . . that is 
the sine qua non of civil marriage.”); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 609 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2005), rev’d and vacated, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1 
(N.Y. 2006) (“Marriage, as it is understood today, is . . . a partnership of two loving equals 
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narrow description is premised on the “close personal relationship” 
model of marriage.20 As one commentator has described it, the 
narrow description views marriage as merely “one kind of close 
personal relationship,” a “subcategory” of a class of two-person 
relationships.21 Under this view, “marriage is seen primarily as a 
private relationship between two people, the primary purpose of 
which is to satisfy the adults who enter it. Marriage is about the 
couple. If children arise from the union, that may be nice, but 
marriage and children are not really connected.”22 This perspective 
“tend[s] to strip marriage of the features that reflect its status and 
importance as a social institution.”23 
Some scholars believe that we are in fact “moving from a 
marriage culture to a culture that celebrates ‘pure relationship,’”24 
which is understood as a relationship “that has been stripped of any 
goal beyond the intrinsic emotional, psychological, or sexual 
satisfaction which the relationship currently brings to the [two adult] 
individuals involved.”25 Under the pure relationship model, 
marriage’s social goods are deemed to be “love and friendship, 
security for adults and their children, economic protection, and 
public affirmation of commitment.”26 
Without much question, California, Connecticut, and Iowa all 
adopt and construct their legal analysis on the foundation of the 
narrow description.27 This foundation is demonstrated in the chart 
 
who choose to commit themselves to each other . . . .”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 
963, 1018 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (“[M]arriage draws its strength from the 
nature of the civil marriage contract itself and the recognition of that contract by the State.”); 
see also Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 319–20, 329–
35 (2008) [hereinafter Stewart, Marriage Facts]. 
 20. This model is discussed in detail in Monte Neil Stewart, Eliding in Washington and 
California, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 501, 508–09, 527–31 (2007), available at 
http://marriagelawfoundation.org/publications/Gonzaga.pdf [hereinafter Stewart, 
Washington and California]. 
 21. COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE 
MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 15 (quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY: 
SEXUALITY, LOVE AND EROTICISM IN MODERN SOCIETIES 58 (1992)).  
 25. Id.  
 26. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (2006). 
 27. Although the California opinion focuses mostly on the right to marry, infra Part  
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below. Before the writing of any of the California, Connecticut, and 
Iowa opinions, the literature fully and fairly brought together the 
components of the narrow description.28 There are many parallels 
between earlier scholarly summaries of the narrow description and 
each of the court decisions, which are also shown in the following 
chart.  
 
Scholarly Summary of Narrow 
Description 
California, Connecticut, and Iowa 
Opinions 
 “For all couples, same-sex 
and man-woman, ‘it is the 
exclusive and permanent 
commitment of the marriage 
partners to one 
another . . . that is the sine 
qua non of civil marriage.’ Or 
stated in slightly different 
words, ‘[m]arriage, as it is 
understood today, is . . . a 
partnership of two loving 
equals who choose to commit 
themselves to each 
other . . . .’”29 
 
Marriage Cases: To enter into 
marriage is “to establish a loving 
and long-term committed 
relationship with another person.”30 
To marry is for “two adults who 
share a loving relationship to join 
together to establish an officially 
recognized family of their own.”31 
 
Kerrigan: Marriage “fulfills 
yearnings for security, safe haven, 
and connection that express our 
common humanity”32 and satisfies 
the desire for a “committed and 
loving relationship.”33 
 
III.B.2.a, it is not completely silent or obscure on what marriage is. That is to be expected 
because it is not possible to address the marriage issue without discussing some view of what 
marriage is. Similar to the Connecticut and Iowa opinions, in the California opinion marriage 
is understood to be nothing more than what the “narrow description” depicts it to be. For 
example, the California court asserts that to marry is for “two adults who share a loving 
relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family of their own . . . .” In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008).  
 28. E.g., Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 329–35; COUNCIL ON FAMILY 
LAW, supra note 21, at 14.  
 29. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 329 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)). 
 30. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400. 
 31. Id. at 399. 
 32. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn. 2008) (quoting 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955). 
 33. Id. at 424. 
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Varnum: “[C]ivil marriage is ‘a 
partnership to which both partners 
bring their financial resources as 
well as their individual energies and 
efforts,’”34 and fulfills the “deeply 
felt need for a committed personal 
relationship.”35
 “Marriage . . . is more than 
merely a loving commitment 
between two adults; it is also a 
very public celebration of 
their commitment.”36 
 
Marriage Cases: Marriage is “the 
opportunity of an individual to 
establish—with the person with 
whom the individual has chosen to 
share his or her life—an officially 
recognized and protected 
family . . . .”37 “[C]ivil marriage [is] 
the means available to an individual 
to establish, with a loved one of his 
or her choice, an officially 
recognized family relationship.”38 
 
Kerrigan: “Civil marriage is at once 
a deeply personal commitment to 
another human being and a highly 
public celebration of the ideals of 
mutuality, companionship, 
intimacy, fidelity, and family”39 and 
is available to “pairs of individuals 
who wish to enter into a formal, 
legally binding and officially 
recognized, long-term family 
relationship.”40 
 
 34. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993)). 
 35. Id. at 885. 
 36. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 330 (citing Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 
954).  
 37. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008). 
 38. Id. at 422 (emphasis added). 
 39. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn. 2008) (quoting 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941). 
 40. Id. at 424 (quoting Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54). 
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Varnum: Official recognition of the 
status of same-sex couples “provides 
an institutional basis for defining 
their fundamental relational rights 
and responsibilities, just as it does 
for heterosexual couples.”41
“[T]he functions and 
purposes that society 
associates with civil marriage 
and the individual needs and 
goods that it promotes” 
include “love and friendship, 
security for adults and their 
children, economic 
protection, and public 
affirmation of 
commitment.”42 
 
Marriage Cases: “The ability of an 
individual to join in a committed, 
long-term, officially recognized 
family relationship with the person 
of his or her choice is often of 
crucial significance . . . . The legal 
commitment to long-term mutual 
emotional and economic support 
that is an integral part of an 
officially recognized marriage 
relationship provides an individual 
with the ability to invest in and rely 
upon a loving relationship with 
another adult . . . .”43  
 
Kerrigan: Marriage has “solemn 
obligations of exclusivity, mutual 
support, and commitment to one 
another.”44 
 
Varnum: “Iowa’s marriage laws . . . 
are designed to bring a sense of 
order to the legal relationships of 
committed couples and their 
families in myriad ways . . . .”45 
 “Civil marriage is a legal 
construct. Its character as a 
creature of law gives it 
efficacy and influence in our 
Marriage Cases: “[T]he legal 
institution of civil marriage” derives 
from early statutes providing “that 
marriage is ‘a personal relation 
 
 41. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). 
 42. MCCLAIN, supra note 26, at 6. 
 43. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 424. 
 44. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 474. 
 45. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883–84. 
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society. ‘[M]arriage draws its 
strength from the nature of 
the civil marriage contract 
itself and the recognition of 
that contract by the State.’”46 
 
arising out of a civil contract.’”47  
 
Kerrigan: Same-sex plaintiffs can 
meet the “statutory eligibility 
requirements applicable to persons 
who seek to marry.”48 
 
Varnum: “[The marriage laws] 
serve to recognize the status of the 
parties’ committed relationship.”49 
“[C]ivil marriage and 
religious marriage are two 
separate and distinct 
phenomena in our society . . . 
the state creates civil marriage 
by law and . . . religion is the 
source of the man-woman 
meaning found in civil 
marriage.”50 
 
Marriage Cases: The legislature may 
see a need to “emphasize and clarify 
that this civil institution [of 
marriage] is distinct from the 
religious institution of marriage.”51 
 
Kerrigan: “[M]arriage is a state 
sanctioned and state regulated 
institution” in which “religious 
objections to same sex marriage 
cannot play a role.”52 
 
Varnum: “The statute at issue in 
this case does not prescribe a 
definition of marriage for religious 
institutions. Instead, the statute 
declares, ‘Marriage is a civil 
contract’ and then regulates that 
civil contract.”53
“Marriage is about the 
couple. If children arise from 
Marriage Cases: Marriage is “a 
relationship that is ‘the center of the 
 
 46. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 332 (quoting Andersen v. King Cnty., 
138 P.3d 963, 1018 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting)).  
 47. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 407 (citations omitted). 
 48. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424. 
 49. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883. 
 50. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 361–62. 
 51. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400, 434. 
 52. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 475. 
 53. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 905 (quoting IOWA CODE § 595.1A (West 2011)). 
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the union, that may be nice, 
but marriage and children are 
not really connected.”54 
 
personal affections that ennoble and 
enrich human life’ . . . a relationship 
that is ‘at once the most socially 
productive and individually fulfilling 
relationship that one can enjoy in 
the course of a lifetime.’ . . . The 
personal enrichment afforded by the 
right to marry may be obtained by a 
couple whether or not they choose 
to have children . . . .”55 
 
Kerrigan: “[E]ven though 
procreative conduct plays an 
important role in many marriages, 
we do not believe that such conduct 
so defines the institution of 
marriage that the inability to engage 
in that conduct is determinative of 
whether same sex and opposite sex 
couples are similarly situated.”56 
 
Varnum: “Plaintiffs are in 
committed and loving relationships, 
many raising families, just like 
heterosexual couples.”57
 
 
 54. COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 21, at 14. 
 55. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432 (quoting De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 
601 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) and Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (1976) (en banc)). In 
the adult relationship aspect of marriage, the California majority opinion does not go as far in 
minimizing the procreative aspects of marriage as does the first American appellate court 
decision to mandate redefinition. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003). There, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said that “it is the exclusive and 
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of 
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.” Id. at 961. In contrast, the California 
majority opinion acknowledges that “promoting and facilitating a stable environment for the 
procreation and raising of children is unquestionably one of the vitally important purposes 
underlying the institution of marriage,” although the opinion then immediately asserts that 
marriage “is not confined to, or restrictively defined by, that purpose alone.” Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d at 432. 
 56. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424–425 n.19. 
 57. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883. 
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Although the chart clearly demonstrates that the opinions rely on 
the narrow description, the strongest evidence that the narrow 
description constitutes the factual foundation of each opinion’s 
discussion of the right to marry is this: each opinion’s apparently 
careful avoidance of the rival “broad description” of contemporary 
American marriage.  
B. The Broad Description of Marriage 
The broad description centers on the reality that marriage is a 
social institution.58 Consequently, it is informed by uncontroversial 
understandings regarding the nature and operation of social 
institutions. These understandings are the product of what is known 
as “the new institutionalism” in the social sciences.59 This is not to 
say that the three opinions deny that marriage is a social institution; 
they do not and, indeed, could not while quoting from the 
numerous prior court decisions on marriage that they use for other 
purposes.60 But the opinions do avoid numerous social institutional 
realities involving marriage and implicated by the decision to 
redefine marriage. Those “avoided” social institutional realities are 
very much a part of the broad description of contemporary American 
marriage. 
An understanding of the broad description of marriage is thus 
important for a variety of reasons. It reveals that the narrow 
description is indeed the factual basis of the California majority 
opinion’s analysis of the right to marry, of the Connecticut and Iowa 
opinions’ analysis of whether same sex couples are similarly situated 
to opposite sex couples for the purpose of the statutes in question, 
and most importantly, of each opinions’ analysis of whether state 
 
 58. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“[T]he marriage relation 
[is] an institution more basic in our civilization than any other.”); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 
948 (“Marriage is a vital social institution.”); Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 320–
29. Despite the fact that Goodridge identified marriage as a vital social institution, it elided a 
wide array of social institutional realities. Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, 
Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 32–39 
(2006) [hereinafter Stewart, Judicial Elision].  
 59. See generally THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter 
W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds. 1991); Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political 
Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996); Victor Nee, Sources of 
the New Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 1 (Mary C. Brinton 
& Victor Nee eds., 2001). 
 60. See, e.g., infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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interests justify the challenged law. It also clarifies that, for each of 
the three opinions, the narrow description is a fundamental premise; 
that is, an unproven starting point for the legal reasoning leading to 
the opinion’s holding. Further, bringing the rival broad description 
to the fore also provides a way to evaluate effectively that 
fundamental premise’s validity; that is, to assess the factual accuracy 
of the narrow description. Finally, the broad description places the 
three opinions’ other fundamental premises in a context that 
facilitates evaluation of their validity. 
As noted, the broad description of contemporary American 
marriage begins with the reality that marriage is a vital social 
institution. Like all social institutions, marriage is constituted by a 
unique web of shared public meanings.61 For important 
institutions, including marriage, many of those meanings rise to the 
level of norms.62 Such social institutions affect individuals profoundly; 
institutional meanings and norms teach, form, and transform 
individuals, supplying identities, purposes, practices, and projects.63 
Those meanings, as the constitutive elements of social institutions, 
are therefore the source of the social goods that any institution 
provides. In other words, it is by teaching and transforming 
individuals across society that an institution’s constitutive meanings 
generate social goods. These social goods lead to the institution’s 
evolution and justify its perpetuation.64 
Across time and cultures, a core meaning constitutive of the 
marriage institution has nearly always been the union of a man and a 
 
 61. See Hall & Taylor, supra note 59, at 947–48; Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 
58, at 9–10. 
 62. Professor Clayton defines an “institution” as “[a]n organized system of social 
relationships (roles, positions, norms) that is pervasively implemented in the society and that 
serves certain basic needs of the society.” RICHARD R. CLAYTON, THE FAMILY, MARRIAGE, 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 22 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis added); see also Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, 
Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 59, at 19 (“An institution is a web of 
interrelated norms—formal and informal—governing social relationships.”); William M. 
Sullivan, Institutions as the Infrastructure of Democracy, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: 
PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 170, 175 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) 
(“Institutions . . . are normative patterns that define purposes and practices, patterns embedded in 
and sanctioned by customs and law.”). For an “omnibus conception of institutions,” see W. 
RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 48–50 (3d ed. 2008). 
 63. See SCOTT, supra note 62, at 54–58; MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 
108 (1986); HELEN REECE, DIVORCING RESPONSIBLY 185 (2003); Stewart, Judicial Elision, 
supra note 58, at 9–10; Sullivan, supra note 62, at 175.  
 64. Stewart, Washington and California, supra note 20, at 503 n.9. 
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woman.65 This core man-woman meaning is material in the 
production of a number of the marriage institution’s valuable social 
goods; but for that meaning, the institution does not provide those 
goods to society.66 As will be seen, proponents of redefinition 
attempt to challenge the nexus between the man-woman meaning 
and some of those goods. But as will also be seen, with respect to 
others of those social goods, the nexus is not rationally contestable, 
such as the child’s bonding right.67  
Another social institutional reality encompassed by the broad 
description pertains to the law’s power. The current legal contest, of 
course, is whether the institution in our society denominated marriage 
will have as its core meaning “the union of a man and a woman” or 
“the union of any two persons.” The former we have been referring to 
as “man-woman marriage”; we will refer to the latter as “genderless 
marriage.”68 Without dispute, the law, within its own domain, has the 
power to replace the man-woman meaning with the any-two-persons 
meaning.69 With the exercise of that power, the law’s influence in the 
 
 65. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 105–20 (2007); INST. FOR 
AM. VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 15 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter INST. AM. VALUES, SOCIAL SCIENCES]. Regarding the 
relative portion of humankind that since pre-history has lived in a society with a marriage 
institution lacking a core man-woman meaning, the academic debate is whether that is a very 
small portion or a very, very small portion. Compare BLANKENHORN, supra at 105–20 (2007) 
with William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1435–84 
(1993). Prof. Eskridge’s “expansive” view of “same-sex marriage” in history is critiqued and 
countered by Peter Lubin & Dwight Duncan, Follow the Footnote or the Advocate as Historian 
of Same-Sex Marriage, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1271 (1998). 
 66. For a detailed discussion of these goods, see Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, 
at 16–20. 
 67. See infra Parts III.B.2–4. 
 68. We do not use the terms “same-sex marriage,” “homosexual marriage,” or “gay 
marriage” because they are misleading in two related ways. First, nowhere in the world is 
marriage defined legally, socially, or otherwise as the union of two persons of the same sex. It is 
defined either as the union of any two persons or as the union of a man and a woman. Second, 
when people confront the marriage issue, the term “same-sex marriage” and others like it often 
prompt them to think of a new, different, and separate marriage arrangement or institution 
that will coexist with the old man-woman marriage institution. But once the judiciary or 
legislature adopts “the union of any two persons” as the legal definition of civil marriage, that 
conception becomes the sole definitional basis for the only law-sanctioned marriage that any 
couple can enter, whether same-sex or man-woman. Therefore, legally sanctioned genderless 
marriage, rather than peacefully coexisting with the contemporary man-woman marriage 
institution, actually displaces and replaces it. 
 69. Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 11–12 (footnotes omitted): 
  Society can use the law effectively to reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle a social 
institution. This is because the law has an expressive or educative function that is 
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larger society operates to change and even deinstitutionalize man-
woman marriage.70 However, as will be discussed later, there is an 
undeniable limit on the law’s power: the law is powerless to give same-
sex couples access to the marriage institution we have always known.71 
But the opinions ignore this social institutional reality.  
Genderless marriage is indeed a radically different institution 
than man-woman marriage. This does not mean, of course, that 
there is no overlap in formative instruction between the two possible 
marriage institutions; but the significance is in the divergence. This 
significant divergence may be seen in the nature of the two 
institutions’ respective social goods.72 Nor should this divergence be 
surprising: fundamentally different meanings, when magnified by 
institutional power and influence, produce divergent social identities, 
aspirations, projects, or ways of behaving, and thus different social 
goods.73 To say otherwise would be to ignore the undisputed effects 
that social institutions have in the formation and transformation of 
individuals. Indeed, well-informed observers of marriage—regardless 
of their sexual, political, or theoretical orientations—repeatedly 
acknowledge the magnitude of the differences between the two 
possible institutions of marriage.74 
 
magnified by its authoritative voice. And in actual practice, the law’s authoritative 
voice is used to reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the shared public meanings that 
constitute a social institution. 
   Use of the law to reinforce, alter, or extinguish the shared public meanings that 
constitute a social institution is a political act. 
See also id. at 7–15. 
 70. See Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 11–12.  
 71. Infra Section III.B.3.  
 72. See Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 20–24. For example, the man-woman 
marriage institution makes meaningful the child’s “bonding right”—a right to know and be 
reared by one’s own biological parents. Id. at 21–22. 
 73. See F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, 
and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2003); see also Marriage Facts, 
supra note 19, at 320–21. 
 74. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 65, at 167 (“I don’t think there can be much 
doubt that this post-institutional view of marriage constitutes a radical redefinition. 
Prominent family scholars on both sides of the divide—those who favor gay marriage and 
those who do not—acknowledge this reality.”); Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in 
DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 
9, 11–13 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 2004) [hereinafter DIVORCING MARRIAGE]; 
Douglas Farrow, Canada’s Romantic Mistake, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra at 1–5; 
LADELLE MCWHORTER, BODIES AND PLEASURES: FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF 
SEXUAL NORMALIZATION 125 (1999); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 393 
(1986); JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN 
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The broad description of the contemporary social institution of 
marriage in America also encompasses other social realities, 
everything from the institutional role of marriage relative to child-
bearing and child-rearing to the contrast between the pre-political 
nature of man-woman marriage and the law-constructed nature of 
genderless marriage. This Article addresses a number of those 
additional social realities in later sections. Only one additional social 
reality merits mention here. It is that a society can have only one 
social institution denominated marriage.75 Society cannot 
simultaneously have as shared, core, constitutive meanings of the 
marriage institution both “the union of a man and a woman” and 
“the union of any two persons;” one meaning necessarily displaces 
the other. Thus, every society must choose either to retain man-
woman marriage or, by force of law, replace it with a radically 
different genderless marriage regime.76 It must be remembered that 
when public meanings and norms are insufficiently shared, the social 
institution constituted by those meanings and norms disappears—as 
do the social goods uniquely provided by that institution. Then we are 
left with merely a diversity of lifestyles, with that diversity being thin 
 
THE POSTMODERN AGE 126–28 (1996); Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The 
Future of an Experiment, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 74, at 48–56; Angela Bolt, 
Do Wedding Dresses Come in Lavender? The Prospects and Implications of Same-Sex Marriage, 
24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 111, 114 (1998); Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 
15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 95–96 (2000); Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage 
Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
33, 53 (2004) [hereinafter Gallagher, Reply] (“Many thoughtful supporters of same-sex 
marriage recognize that some profound shift in our whole understanding of the world is 
wrapped up in this legal re-engineering of the meaning of marriage.”); E.J. Graff, Retying 
the Knot, THE NATION, June 24, 1996, at 12 (“The right wing gets it: Same-sex marriage is 
a breathtakingly subversive idea. . . . Marriage is an institution that towers on our social 
horizon, defining how we think about one another . . . . [S]ame-sex marriage . . . announces 
that marriage has changed shape.”); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist 
Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 12–19 (1991); Andrew Sullivan, Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 13, 15–16 (1996). 
 75. Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 24 (“Given the role of language and 
meaning in constituting and sustaining institutions, two ‘coexisting’ social institutions known 
society-wide as marriage amount to a factual impossibility.”). 
 76. A society actually has three options: man-woman marriage, genderless marriage, or 
no normative marriage institution at all. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 327 n.47. 
Although the contemporary American political reality is limited to the first two options, many 
of the most influential advocates of genderless marriage correctly and gladly see that as leading 
quite naturally to no normative marriage institution at all. See infra note 117 and 
accompanying text. 
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gruel indeed compared with the productivity of thick (because they 
are institutionalized) meanings.77 
In sum, the broad description provides the factual basis for what 
may be called “the social institutional argument for man-woman 
marriage.” It is simply that, for the law (constitutional law, no less) to 
suppress the man-woman meaning by replacing it with the any-two-
persons meaning is to cause the loss of the valuable social goods that 
the man-woman meaning, because institutionalized, has provided our 
society. Because of the value of those goods, society (and hence 
government) has a compelling interest in their perpetuation. The 
compelling nature of that governmental interest means that the laws 
sustaining the man-woman meaning should survive every 
constitutional attack, regardless of which standard of review a court 
may employ.78  
C. Comparing the Narrow and Broad Descriptions 
As to the relationship between the narrow description and the 
broad description, the broad description encompasses most, but not 
all, of the narrow description. It encompasses, for example, the 
narrow description’s reference to the social goods of “love and 
friendship, security for adults and their children, economic 
protection, and public affirmation of commitment,”79 as well as the 
ideal of “a partnership of equals with equal rights, who have 
mutually joined to form a new family unit, founded upon shared 
intimacy and mutual financial and emotional support.”80 The broad 
description, however, also consists of much more. As noted, it sees 
the institutionalized man-woman meaning as the source of 
additional social goods. 
The narrow description, in operation, insists that marriage is no 
more than what the narrow description depicts. Although genderless 
marriage proponents rarely, if ever, expressly state that notion of “no 
 
 77. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 328 (“When the social institution of 
marriage disappears, what remains is a motley crew of lifestyles. A lifestyle without institutional 
context is like Monopoly money: it resembles true currency, but lacks the essential shared 
meaning that provides its value.”). 
 78. See id. at 364–68 for a discussion on applying standards of review to the marriage 
question.  
 79. MCCLAIN, supra note 26, at 6.  
 80. Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (Saxe, J., 
dissenting). 
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more than,” the notion is always implicit in their arguments,81 and 
the reasoning in the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions is 
no exception. This “no more than” notion goes to the heart of the 
veracity of the narrow and broad descriptions. If that notion is 
factually accurate, it must follow that what the broad description 
depicts beyond the narrow description’s scope is factually false. 
Conversely, if the “no more than” notion is erroneous as a matter of 
fact, that error would be established by the validation of the broad 
description’s additional depictions. 
All these understandings together shed a clarifying light on the 
three opinions’ first fundamental premise: contemporary American 
marriage is nothing more than what the narrow description depicts it 
to be. The key question, of course, is whether that premise is valid. It 
is not.  
With respect to the contemporary marriage institution across 
these three states and the nation, the competent evidence strongly 
validates the broad description and strongly falsifies the narrow 
description. In contemporary America, “the union of a man and a 
woman” continues as a widely shared, public, and core meaning 
constitutive of the marriage institution, all across the nation; in other 
words, that meaning continues to be institutionalized.82 That 
meaning has not been deinstitutionalized by broad social trends 
anywhere, and only in Massachusetts and now California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa has a court by legal mandate attempted to 
perform that task.83 That is not to say that the man-woman meaning 
is universally shared; a narrow view of marriage is common in some 
sections of the population.84 But the narrow description is not 
subscribed to beyond those sections. 
 
 81. This is discussed in more detail in Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts and Critical 
Morality, MARRIAGE LAW FOUNDATION, 35–44 (Fall 2007), 
http://marriagelawfoundation.org/publications/Facts.pdf. 
 82. This has been addressed elsewhere at some length. See Stewart, Marriage Facts, 
supra note 19, at 322–23, 339–50. Further, according to the Human Rights Campaign, 
twenty-nine states have constitutional amendments defining marriage as including one man 
and woman, while twelve states have defined marriage as such by statute. Statewide Marriage 
Prohibitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/ 
resources/marriage_prohibitions_2009(1).pdf. The federal government has also passed a 
Defense of Marriage Act. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).  
 83. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 84. See Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 323.  
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Although much of the narrow description is accurate, it 
incorrectly asserts that it is a complete description. The additional 
elements of marriage recognized by the broad description (i.e., child-
bearing and rearing, bridging the male-female divide, providing the 
identities of husband and wife, etc.) are integral features of the 
American marriage institution. While not always universally shared, 
they are shared sufficiently throughout the country to be considered 
institutionalized and thus should not be excluded from the marriage 
definition.  
Although acknowledging, as it must, that marriage is a vital 
social institution,85 each court ignores key institutional realities. Each 
ignores that marriage, like all social institutions, is constituted by 
widely shared social meanings and that these institutionalized 
meanings teach and transform individuals. They also ignore, perhaps 
most importantly, that the social institution premised on and 
constituted by the virtually universal man-woman meaning provides 
a number of social goods beyond those offered by genderless 
marriage. For example, the California majority opinion ignored the 
compelling governmental interests advanced by the institutionalized 
man-woman meaning and held that “retention of the traditional 
definition of marriage does not constitute a state interest sufficiently 
compelling, under the strict scrutiny equal protection standard,” to 
withstand constitutional attack.86 The same analysis and conclusion is 
present in each of the Connecticut87 and Iowa88 opinions in 
substantially similar form. Each court’s flawed reasoning flows from 
use of a false fundamental premise—that contemporary California, 
Connecticut, Iowa, and American marriage is no more than what the 
narrow description depicts it to be. 
 
 85. E.g., Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398, 401, 421–24, 431–32, 445, 448, 451; 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412, 416–20, 424 n.19, 473–74, 474 n.75, 477–80; Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 873, 875, 878, 883–84, 891, 897, 899 n.25, 901–02, 905–07.  
 86. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452. 
 87. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 480 (heightened scrutiny) (“It is only because the state 
has not advanced a sufficiently persuasive justification for denying same sex couples the right to 
marry that the traditional definition of marriage necessarily must be expanded to include such 
couples. If the defendants were able to demonstrate sufficient cause to deny same sex couples 
the right to marry, then we would reject the plaintiffs’ claim and honor the state’s desire to 
preserve the institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman.”). 
 88. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 904 (“Having examined each proffered governmental 
objective through the appropriate lens of intermediate scrutiny, we conclude that sexual-
orientation-based classification under the marriage statute does not substantially further any of 
the objectives.”). 
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The following sections will examine in more detail the 
consequences of the use of this and other flawed fundamental 
premises. 
III. THE “NO-DOWNSIDE” ARGUMENT, LOSS OF SOCIAL GOODS, 
AND MORE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES  
Since the beginning of the debate over the marriage issue, 
proponents of genderless marriage, including judges, have 
consistently deployed one particular argument. It is that redefinition 
will have no downside; neither heterosexual couples, children, the 
marriage institution, other social institutions, nor society generally 
will experience any harm from the legal redefinition of marriage.89 In 
popular discourse, the no-downside argument frequently appears in 
the form of a question intended to be rhetorical: “How will letting 
John and James marry hurt you or your marriage?”  
The California majority opinion deploys the no-downside 
argument more frequently and advances it more strongly than any 
other judicial opinion favoring redefinition. For example, the 
opinion asserts that  
permitting same-sex couples access to the designation of marriage 
will not deprive opposite-sex couples of any rights and will not alter 
the legal framework of the institution of marriage, because same-
sex couples who choose to marry will be subject to the same 
obligations and duties that currently are imposed on married 
opposite-sex couples. 90 
It also argues that recognizing genderless marriage will not “deprive 
any opposite-sex couple or their children of any of the rights and 
benefits conferred by the marriage statutes,”91 and will not “alter or 
 
 89. Examples of judicial use of the no-downside argument are collected in Stewart, 
Washington and California, supra note 20, at 519–25 and Stewart, Redefinition, supra note 
12, at 35–36. 
 90. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401. 
 91. Instead, the opinion asserts that recognizing same-sex marriage 
simply will make the benefit of the marriage designation available to same-sex 
couples and their children. As Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals 
succinctly observed in her dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles, “There are 
enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.” Further, permitting same-sex 
couples access to the designation of marriage will not alter the substantive nature of 
the legal institution of marriage; same-sex couples who choose to enter into the 
relationship with that designation will be subject to the same duties and obligations 
to each other, to their children, and to third parties that the law currently imposes 
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diminish either the legal responsibilities that biological parents owe 
to their children or the substantial incentives that the state provides 
to a child’s biological parents to enter into and raise their child in a 
stable, long-term committed relationship.”92  
The Connecticut majority opinion both cites and directly quotes 
the California majority opinion,93 and also employs its own variants 
of the no-downside argument, noting that a change to allow 
genderless marriage would “expand the right to marry without any 
adverse effect on those already free to exercise the right.”94 Not to be 
 
upon opposite-sex couples who marry. Finally, affording same-sex couples the 
opportunity to obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge upon the 
religious freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person; no 
religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to 
same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to solemnize a marriage 
in contravention of his or her religious beliefs. 
 Id. at 451–52 (internal citations omitted).  
 92. The court explains further:  
Our recognition that the core substantive rights encompassed by the constitutional 
right to marry apply to same-sex as well as opposite-sex couples does not imply in 
any way that it is unimportant or immaterial to the state whether a child is raised by 
his or her biological mother and father. . . . Instead, such an interpretation of the 
constitutional right to marry simply confirms that a stable two-parent family 
relationship, supported by the state’s official recognition and protection, is equally as 
important for the numerous children in California who are being raised by same-sex 
couples as for those children being raised by opposite-sex couples (whether they are 
biological parents or adoptive parents). 
 Id. at 433. 
 93. The direct quotation from Marriage Cases states: 
[G]ranting same sex couples the right to marry “will not alter the substantive nature 
of the legal institution of marriage; same-sex couples who choose to enter into the 
relationship with that designation will be subject to the same duties and obligations 
to each other, to their children, and to third parties that the law currently imposes 
[on] opposite-sex couples who marry.” 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 473 (Conn. 2008) (quoting Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d at 451–52). 
 94. Id. at 474. The court employs the no-downside argument in several additional 
instances: “Nor will same sex marriage deprive opposite sex couples of any rights. In other 
words, limiting marriage to opposite sex couples is not necessary to preserve the rights that 
those couples now enjoy.” Id. at 473.  
We therefore agree with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that 
“broadening civil marriage to include same-sex couples . . . [will] not disturb the 
fundamental value of marriage in our society” and “[r]ecognizing the right of an 
individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity 
of opposite-sex marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to 
marry a person of a different race devalues the marriage of a person who marries 
someone of her own race.”  
Id. at 474 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003)). 
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left out, the Iowa court treads methodically down all the well-worn 
paths of the no-downside argument, declaring that redefinition will 
not “transform civil marriage into something less than it presently is 
for heterosexuals.”95 The similar and extensive employment of the 
no-downside argument by each of the California, Connecticut, and 
Iowa courts is striking, and as will be shown, is essential to the 
conclusion reached by these courts. 
Ultimately, the no-downside argument is an argument about 
likely consequences. Rigorously considered, it is an argument about 
the likelihood of diminishing or losing valuable social goods 
provided by the marriage institution. Those goods fall into one of 
three categories. The first encompasses those goods produced by the 
marriage institution that are, at least at first glance, independent of 
the institution’s man-woman meaning. The second encompasses 
 
“Religious freedom will not be jeopardized by the marriage of same sex couples because 
religious organizations that oppose same sex marriage as irreconcilable with their beliefs will 
not be required to perform same sex marriages or otherwise to condone same sex marriage or 
relations.” Id. at 475.  
To whatever extent [the interest in regulating and privileging procreative conduct] 
might constitute a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite sex couples, it 
certainly does not represent a strong or overriding reason for the classification 
because allowing same sex couples to marry in no way undermines any interest that 
the state may have in regulating procreative conduct between opposite sex couples. 
Id. at 477 n.78. 
 95. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 n.25 (Iowa 2009). The no-downside 
argument continues:  
The preservation of traditional marriage could only be a legitimate reason for the 
classification if expanding marriage to include others in its definition would 
undermine the traditional institution. The County has simply failed to explain how 
the traditional institution of civil marriage would suffer if same-sex civil marriage 
were allowed.  
Id. “Likewise, the exclusion of gays and lesbians from marriage does not benefit the interests of 
those children of heterosexual parents, who are able to enjoy the environment supported by 
marriage with or without the inclusion of same-sex couples.” Id. at 901. “While the institution 
of civil marriage likely encourages stability in opposite-sex relationships, we must evaluate 
whether excluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage encourages stability in opposite-
sex relationships. The County offers no reasons that it does, and we can find none.” Id. at 902. 
Religious doctrine and views contrary to this principle of law are unaffected, and 
people can continue to associate with the religion that best reflects their views. A 
religious denomination can still define marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman, and a marriage ceremony performed by a minister, priest, rabbi, or other 
person ordained or designated as a leader of the person’s religious faith does not 
lose its meaning as a sacrament or other religious institution. The sanctity of all 
religious marriages celebrated in the future will have the same meaning as those 
celebrated in the past.  
Id. at 906. 
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those goods produced by the marriage institution that may or may 
not be materially provided by the man-woman meaning; the nexus is 
contested. The third encompasses those goods clearly provided by 
the man-woman meaning; the nexus is not contested and, within the 
bounds of reason, cannot be. These three categories become 
important in the discussion of redefinition’s consequences. 
A. Marriage’s Social Goods and the Man-Woman Meaning 
Regarding the first category, the California majority opinion 
makes a clever96 move. It emphasizes the social goods produced by 
the marriage institution by relying on the work of two of the most 
respected proponents of man-woman marriage, Mary Ann Glendon 
and Bruce Hafen.97 The obvious purpose of this move is to bolster 
the no-downside argument by suggesting not only no loss of 
valuable social goods from redefinition, but also the new and 
laudable provision of those goods to same-sex couples and the 
children they are rearing.  
For example, the California majority cites Hafen’s findings that 
the family is a “principal source of moral and civic duty”98 and has 
important roles in society “to nurture the young,” “instill the habits 
required for citizenship in a self-governing community,” to “teach us 
to care for others,” and “to moderate . . . self-interest.”99 The 
opinion also quotes Glendon’s assertions that “society still relies on 
families to play a crucial role in caring for the young, the aged, the 
sick, the severely disabled, and the needy. Even in advanced welfare 
states, families at all levels are a major resource for government, 
sharing the burdens of dependency with public agencies in various 
ways . . . .”100 In support of these statements, the majority opinion 
again cites Hafen to explain how marriage helps a family to produce 
these social goods:  
Marriage . . . carries with it a commitment toward permanence that 
places it in a different category of relational interests than if it were 
 
 96. The term “clever” here is in the American, not the British, sense of the word. 
 97. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 423–25 nn.36–40. 
 98. Id. at 424 n.36 (quoting Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, 
Kinship and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
463, 476–77 (1983)).  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 424, n.37 (quoting Mary Ann Glendon, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY 
LAW 306 (1989)). 
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temporary. A “justifiable expectation . . . that [the] relationship will 
continue indefinitely” permits parties to invest themselves in the 
relationship with a reasonable belief that the likelihood of future 
benefits warrants the attendant risks and inconveniences.101  
This aspect of the California majority opinion’s no-downside 
argument, however, is valid if, and only if, one condition is met. 
That condition is that the legal suppression of the man-woman 
meaning and its replacement with the any-two-persons meaning 
leaves the marriage institution just as healthy, robust, and productive 
as before. The California majority opinion presupposes that 
outcome.102 Thus, the majority opinion relies on a fundamental 
premise that is unproven and not clearly articulated but crucial to the 
validity of the judicial argument constructed on it. 
In a similar, but perhaps more explicit fashion, the Connecticut 
and Iowa opinions posit that redefinition will not cause any loss of 
the valuable social goods resulting from the marriage institution but 
rather that it will extend those goods to same-sex couples. The 
Connecticut opinion clearly associates the right to marry with the 
benefits of marriage. It asserts that the freedom to marry is an 
important right because “children reared by married couples and 
married couples themselves benefit greatly from marriage—apart 
from any legal benefits conferred on the family. Benefits to the 
married couple include greater longevity, greater wealth, more 
fulfilling sexual relationships, and greater happiness.”103 The opinion 
then explains that the marriage institution and its benefits will 
remain after redefinition because “the change would expand the 
right to marry without any adverse effect on those already free to 
exercise the right. . . . If anything, extending civil marriage to same-
sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and 
communities.”104 The Connecticut court clearly adopts the view that 
the legal suppression of the man-woman meaning and its 
replacement with the any-two-persons meaning will leave the 
marriage institution just as healthy, robust, and productive as before; 
the opinion even seems to imply that redefinition will strengthen the 
marriage institution. 
 
 101. Id. at 424, n.38 (quoting Hafen, supra note 98, at 485–86). 
 102. See infra Part III.B.2.a.  
 103. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 474 n.75 (Conn. 2008) 
(quoting amicus brief of Alliance for Marriage) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. at 474. 
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The Iowa opinion is likewise explicit about its assumption on 
redefinition. The court asserts, “The County has simply failed to 
explain how the traditional institution of civil marriage would suffer 
if same-sex civil marriage were allowed. There is no legitimate notion 
that a more inclusive definition of marriage will transform civil 
marriage into something less than it presently is for heterosexuals.”105 
The Iowa opinion then also asserts in various contexts throughout 
the opinion that the redefinition of marriage will bring the benefits 
of marriage to same-sex couples.106  
The authors of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions 
thus each viewed their work as bringing the benefits of marriage to 
same-sex couples, all the while avoiding any adverse impact upon the 
institution of marriage and its benefits. The underlying fundamental 
premise, as identified earlier, is that redefinition leaves the marriage 
institution just as healthy, robust, and productive as before. There 
are good reasons to believe that this particular fundamental premise 
is false.  
A salient social institutional reality is this: man-woman marriage is a 
pre-political institution, while genderless marriage must of necessity be a 
post-political, law-constructed, and hence fragile institution.107 As to the 
nature of man-woman marriage, we turn to John Locke. Locke, like 
other Enlightenment thinkers, appreciated the value of forms of 
social order separate from the state, “institutions of civil society” or 
“civil institutions,” that, in Locke’s view, included what he called 
“conjugal society,” meaning marriage and family.108 Locke viewed 
 
 105. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 n.25 (Iowa 2009). 
 106. The court in Varnum framed the issue before it in terms of extending benefits to 
same-sex couples and made numerous references to this objective throughout the opinion. The 
court from the onset described Plaintiffs as seeking “to declare the marriage statute 
unconstitutional so they can obtain the array of benefits of marriage enjoyed by heterosexual 
couples . . . .” Id. at 872. Additional references to the benefits of marriage and their 
importance to same-sex couples are found throughout the opinion. See id. at 873, 884, 905. 
 107. See Seana Sugrue, Soft Depotism and Same-Sex Marriage, THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE: 
FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, AND MORALS 172, 180–81, 186–91 (Robert P. George & Jean B. 
Elshtain eds., 2006).  
 108. See id. at 172, 173, 175. Locke defined conjugal society as follows:  
[Conjugal society] is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and 
though it consist[s] chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies, 
as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support, and 
assistance, and a communion of interest too, as necessary not only to unite their care 
and affection; but also necessary to their common offspring, who have a right to be 
nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves. 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 47 (Richard H. Cox ed., 1982) (1690).  
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conjugal society as one of those “forms of social order the existence 
of which are independent of the state,” referring to it as a “pre-
political social order.”109 Indeed, Locke’s philosophies (of large 
historical importance to the federal and many state constitutions) 
“stipulat[e] clearly that rights and responsibilities, including those 
pertaining to conjugal society, are not created by the state”110 but are 
“[n]ormative institutions . . . exist[ing] because they are compelling 
forms of social order that advance basic human goods.”111 The 
natural strength of the man-woman marriage institution is seen in 
the fact that is has been present, and vitally so, in virtually all human 
societies since pre-history.112 In contrast, “[b]eing entirely a creation of 
the state, [the genderless marriage institution] is an institution that needs 
to be coddled, and which demands cocooning to protect it. Its very 
fragility demands a culture in which it is protected.”113 
The historic durability of the marriage institution, however, is 
not an adequate assurance that it will continue institutionalized after 
redefinition. After all, many vital social institutions, including 
marriage and private property, have been unmade by law and 
government policy at times in human history.114 As discussed 
 
 109. Sugrue, supra note 107, at 176. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 113. Sugrue, supra note 107, at 190. 
 114. Regarding the social institution of private property, see, for example, 
KONSTITUTSIIA R.S.R.S.R. [CONSTITUTION] July 10, 1918, art. 3 (Russia), available at 
http://www.politicsforum.org/documents/constitution_rsfsr_1918.php. The Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic declared  
Pursuant to the socialization of land, private land ownership is hereby abolished, and 
all land is proclaimed the property of the entire people and turned over to the 
working people without any redemption, on the principles of egalitarian land tenure. 
All forests, mineral wealth and waters of national importance, as well as all live and 
dead stock, model estates and agricultural enterprises are proclaimed the property of 
the nation . . . [as well as] the complete conversion of factories, mines, railways, and 
other means of production and transportation into the property of the Soviet 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic. 
Id. See also Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private 
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of political institutions, 
including law, in the development of property rights). Regarding the social institution of 
marriage, see Lynn D. Wardle, The “Withering Away” of Marriage: Some Lessons from the 
Bolshevik Family Law Reforms in Russia, 1917-1926, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469 (2004). 
Professor Bowman’s criticism of Wardle’s account is flawed because it fails to acknowledge that 
some years after Soviet law deinstitutionalized marriage it re-institutionalized it because of the 
social costs of the earlier experiment. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal 
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earlier,115 a salient social institutional reality is the law’s power to suppress 
the man-woman meaning and thereby deinstitutionalize marriage. The 
reach of that power should not be underestimated, especially when, after 
redefinition, the old meaning is deemed “unconstitutional” and the 
mandate imposing the new meaning is seen as vindicating a “fundamental 
right.” To change the meaning of marriage to that of any two persons  
is to transform profoundly the institution, if not immediately then 
certainly over time as the new meaning is mandated in texts, in 
schools, and in many other parts of the public square and 
voluntarily published by the media and other institutions, with 
society, especially its children, thereby losing the ability to discern 
the meanings of the old institution.116 
Finally, the ability of law and policy to undermine even pre-political 
institutions is affirmed by this reality: many of the bright and informed 
people advocating for genderless marriage are doing so exactly because 
they see redefinition as leading surely and probably quickly to a society 
that has no normative marriage institution at all.117 
Taken together, these realities raise serious concerns about the 
ongoing health and productivity of the marriage institution in 
California, Connecticut, and Iowa after redefinition. It must be 
remembered that, when public meanings and norms are insufficiently 
shared, the social institution constituted by those meanings and 
norms disappears—as do the social goods uniquely and previously 
 
Policy: The Case of Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 41–42 (2007). 
 115. See supra note 66; see also Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 36 (The “law 
has a purpose and a power to preserve or change social institutions. . . . [T]he social institution 
of marriage is not at all immune, but rather is open, to fundamental change resulting from a 
profound change in the law’s definition of marriage.”). 
 116. Stewart, Redefinition, supra note 12, at 111. 
 117. See, e.g., Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families & 
Relationships, BEYONDMARRIAGE.ORG, July 26, 2006, http://www.beyondmarriage.org/ 
BeyondMarriage.pdf (asserting that “[m]arriage is not the only worthy form of family or 
relationship, and it should not be legally and economically privileged above all others” and 
declaring that they “hope to move beyond the narrow confines of marriage politics . . . [and] 
reflect and honor the diverse ways in which people find and practice love, form relationships, 
create communities and networks of caring and support, establish households, bring families 
into being, and build innovative structures to support and sustain community”); Stanley Kurtz, 
The Confession, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2006, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/219092/confession/stanley-kurtz (discussing the 
“Beyond Same-Sex Marriage” manifesto); Stanley Kurtz, The Confession II, NATIONAL REVIEW 
ONLINE, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/219108/confession-
ii/stanley-kurtz (describing the “radical” movement to move beyond marriage); see also 
Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 327 n.47. 
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provided by that institution. When the disappearing social institution 
is marriage, what is left is a motley crew of lifestyles, and a lifestyle is 
to an institution what a plain sheet of paper is to a $1000 bill. This 
analogy is apt because money is one of our most important social 
institutions.118 But perhaps another analogy is even more apt, the 
analogy of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions’ 
subscribing justices as surgeons. They have a living body on the 
operating table, have removed the heart (the man-woman meaning), 
which they deem diseased, have replaced it with a sanitized but 
untested and wholly artificial heart (the any-two-persons meaning), 
have sewn up the patient, and have done all this on the basis of an 
unproven assumption, a premise, that the body will get up and move 
forward as healthy and productive as before. Because credible 
evidence, fully avoided by the surgeons, raises serious concerns that 
the premise is false, caring onlookers may be forgiven for their deep 
fears about the outcome of the operation. 
So what seemed initially an easy score for the California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa opinions—making the no-downside 
argument by emphasizing the importance of a number of the 
marriage institution’s valuable social goods—on closer inspection is 
seen to be an argument constructed on a probably false fundamental 
premise and therefore one unworthy of respect. Moreover, the very 
value of the social goods cries out against a life-or-death, but 
nevertheless elective, heart operation thought reasonable and helpful 
only because strong contrary evidence is ignored.  
B. Loss of Social Goods  
The second (nexus contested) and third (nexus uncontestable) 
categories of man-woman marriage’s social goods may helpfully be 
identified together. Here is one catalogue: 
 
 
 
 118. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 32 (1995): 
[I]n order that the concept “money” apply to the stuff in my pocket, it has to be the 
sort of thing that people think is money. If everybody stops believing it is money, it 
ceases to function as money, and eventually ceases to be money . . . . [I]n order that 
a type of thing should satisfy the definition, in order that it should fall under the 
concept of money, it must be believed to be, or used as, or regarded as, etc., 
satisfying the definition . . . . And what goes for money goes for elections, private 
property, wars, voting, promises, marriages, buying and selling, political offices, and 
so on. 
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The man-woman marriage institution is: 
 
1. Society’s best and perhaps only effective means to secure the 
right of a child to know and be raised by her biological 
parents (with exceptions justified only when they are in the 
best interests of the child). 
 
2. The most effective means yet developed to maximize the 
private welfare provided to children conceived by passionate, 
heterosexual coupling (with “private welfare” meaning not 
only basic requirements like food and shelter, but also 
education, play, work, discipline, love, and respect). 
 
3. The indispensable foundation for that child-rearing mode—
that is, married mother-father child-rearing—that correlates 
(in ways not subject to reasonable dispute) with the optimal 
outcomes deemed crucial for a child’s, and therefore society’s, 
well-being. 
 
4. Society’s primary and most effective means of bridging the 
male-female divide.  
 
5. Society’s only means of transforming a male into husband-
father, and a female into wife-mother, statuses and identities 
particularly beneficial to society. 
 
6. Social and official endorsement of the form of adult 
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may 
rationally value above all other such forms.119 
 
For some of these goods, the nexus between the man-woman 
meaning and the production of the good is contested. Of all the 
goods listed, the most contested is the third, that the married 
mother-father relationship is the optimal context for child-rearing. 
For others of these goods, however, this nexus cannot rationally be 
contested. For example, the first social good, that man-woman 
marriage is society’s best and probably only effective means to secure 
 
 119. See Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 321–22 (internal citations omitted) 
for additional sources discussing these social goods.  
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the right of a child to know and be raised by her biological parents 
(with exceptions justified only when they are in the best interests of 
the child), is uncontestable.120 A related social good is found in man-
woman marriage’s nurturing of the norm that a biological parent 
“will not abandon, give away, or leave . . . to the public charge” his 
or her child.121 Two further examples are man-woman marriage’s 
role as society’s primary and most effective means of bridging the 
male-female divide122 and its only means of providing the statuses 
and identities of husband and wife (with all the meanings, practices, 
projects, and ways of relating to others that those entail).123 Each of 
these goods will be discussed in turn.  
1. The optimal childrearing mode  
As noted, the third social good cataloged, that the married 
mother-father relationship is the optimal context for child-rearing, is 
most contested. To counter this social good, genderless marriage 
proponents have presented evidence that the outcomes for same-sex 
couple childrearing are just as good as those for married mother- 
father childrearing.124 They use this evidence to argue that the third 
 
 120. See, e.g., COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: 
THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S NEEDS 32 (2006), 
available at http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/parenthood.pdf (“The legalization of same-sex 
marriage, while sometimes seen as a small change affecting just a few people, raises the startling 
prospect of fundamentally breaking the legal institution of marriage from any ties to biological 
parenthood.”); Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, 
supra note 74, at 67 (“[A]ccepting same-sex marriage necessarily means accepting that the 
societal institution of marriage is intended primarily for the benefit of the partners to the 
marriage, and only secondarily for the children born into it.”). 
 121. Margaret Liu McConnell, Less Perfect Unions, The Argument Against Same-Sex 
Marriage That Hasn’t Been Tried in the Courts, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, May 19, 
2008, at 23, 23, available at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/article/ 
2008/may/19/00023/.  
 122. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 93 (“More than any other human 
relationship, marriage bridges the sexual divide in the human species.”); COUNCIL ON 
FAMILY LAW, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that marriage “provides an evolving form of life 
that helps men and women negotiate the sex divide”). 
 123. See DeCoste, supra note 73, at 625–28.  
 124. See, for example, LESLIE COOPER & PAUL CATES, TOO HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE 
AGAINST RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 38–73 (2d ed. 2005), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file480_27496.pdf, for a review of 25 leading 
studies from 1981 to 2004 showing no difference between homosexual and heterosexual 
parenting. See also William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, 
and America’s Children, 15 MARRIAGE & CHILD WELLBEING 97, 97 (2005); Michael S. 
Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 291, 
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social good is not dependent on the man-woman meaning but 
results in when two caring adults in a committed, loving relationship 
act as parents for the child. Thus, redefining marriage will not 
eliminate this social good but will actually increase it because it will 
strengthen and support the relationship between same-sex couples, 
many of which are raising children. Man-woman marriage 
proponents counter by noting, and accurately, that such evidence 
does not meet the usual standards for scientific validity.125 At the 
same time, those proponents note that the studies identifying 
married man-woman marriage as the optimal child-rearing model do 
meet those standards.126 
The two opinions making up the majority in the only prior 
American appellate court decision to mandate genderless marriage, 
 
321 (2001) (“[T]he evidence shows that children raised by gay parents develop just as well as 
children raised by heterosexual couples . . . .”); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Maryland Psychologists, Social Workers, and Child Welfare Advocates Speak Out in Support of 
Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, ACLU (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/27548prs20061130.html. 
 125. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 52–55, cites the following sources, which 
assert that the “no differences” studies do not meet “good science requirements:” Declaration 
of Alan J. Hawkins as Expert Witness for Defendant at 8–9, Varnum v. Brien, No. CV 5965 
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2007); 164 Affidavit of Steven Lowell Nock, Halpern v. Attorney 
General, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, File 684/00, available at http:// 
www.marriagewatch.org/Law/cases/Canada/ontario/halpern/aff_nock.pdf (discussing how 
none of the “no differences” studies meet “good-science” requirements). Numerous other 
scholars have similarly asserted that the “no differences” studies are flawed. See, e.g., George 
Rekers & Mark Kilgus, Studies of Homosexual Parenting: A Critical Review, 14 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 343, 345, 382 (2002) (asserting that “the existing studies on homosexual parenting are 
methodologically flawed” in that most “are biased with regard to subject selection in that they 
generally report on a small group of research subjects which are not randomly selected and 
which do not constitute a scientifically representative sample of homosexual parents and their 
children”); ROBERT LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, NO BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON’T 
TELL US ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING (2001), available at http://www.marriagewatch.org/ 
publications/nobasis.pdf (reviewing 49 “no-differences” studies on same-sex parenting and 
finding flaws in their experiment design and conclusions); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential 
Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997).  
 126. Examples of these studies are discussed in detail in Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra 
note 19, at 52–55. Some of the studies cited showing the benefits of heterosexual parenting 
include: LORRAINE BLACKMAN ET AL., CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE FOR AFRICAN 
AMERICANS: A COMPREHENSIVE LITERATURE REVIEW 4–5 (2005); THE WITHERSPOON 
INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 21–43 (2008), available at 
http://www.winst.org/family_marriage_and_democracy/WI_Marriage.pdf; INST. FOR AM. 
VALUES, FAMILY STRUCTURE AND CHILDREN’S EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES (2005); Paul R. 
Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-
Being of the Next Generation, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 75 (2005); William C. Duncan, The 
Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses to Non-Marital Cohabitation, 82 OR. L. REV. 
1001 (2003). 
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,127 were silent on this 
particular contest between scientific findings.128 The California 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion was not. It concluded that the 
scientific contest has already been resolved in favor of the genderless 
marriage position—by political action. Specifically, the majority 
opinion referenced legislation deemed to be premised on the 
judgment that the outcomes for same-sex couple parenting were as 
good as those associated with married mother-father parenting.129 
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s majority opinion essentially 
avoided the contest between scientific findings by asserting that the 
defendants had abandoned the argument that man-woman marriage 
was essential to the optimal child-rearing mode.130 The Connecticut 
court opinion did not identify how or when or why the attorney 
general abandoned the argument or, more importantly, why the 
court should not still grapple with it given that it was before the 
court in amicus briefs131 and was addressed in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Zarella.132 It seems fair to say that the majority opinion 
elided this argument, even though it is, in Justice Zarella’s words, 
“the only argument that other courts have found to be persuasive in 
 
 127. Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 128. See id. at 979–80 (Sosman, J., dissenting). 
 129. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008) (“[O]ur state now 
recognizes that an individual’s capacity . . . responsibly to care for and raise children does not 
depend upon the individual’s sexual orientation . . . .”); id. at 428 (“This state’s current 
policies and conduct regarding homosexuality . . . recognize that gay individuals are fully 
capable . . . of responsibly caring for and raising children.”); id. at 452 n.72: 
[T]he distinction in nomenclature between marriage and domestic partnership 
cannot be defended on the basis of an asserted difference in the effect on children of 
being raised by an opposite-sex couple instead of by a same-sex couple. Because the 
governing California statutes permit same-sex couples to adopt and raise children 
and additionally draw no distinction between married couples and domestic partners 
with regard to the legal rights and responsibilities relating to children raised within 
each of these family relationships, the asserted difference in the effect on children 
does not provide a justification for the differentiation in nomenclature set forth in 
the challenged statutes. 
 130. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 478 (Conn. 2008). 
 131. Id. Indeed, the Connecticut court’s elision of the optimal child-rearing argument is 
all the more remarkable in light of this aspect of the procedural history: the Family Institute of 
Connecticut, which ultimately presented an amicus brief expounding this argument, initially 
sought to intervene to ensure adequate presentation of the argument but was denied by the 
trial court. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that denial, concluding that the issues 
raised by amicus would be adequately presented by the attorney general and that at any rate, 
amicus would be free to file a brief with the court. Id. 
 132. Id. at 524 (Zarella, J., dissenting). 
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determining that limited marriage to one man and one woman is not 
unconstitutional.”133  
The Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion did what no other appellate 
opinion has presumed to do—arbitrate between the conflicting 
scientific studies and declare a winner. Its performance, however, was 
problematic.134 The opinion briefly summarized the conflicting 
evidence placed before the court135 and then, without serious 
discussion, opined that the research “strongly support[s] the 
conclusion that same-sex couples foster the same wholesome 
environment as opposite-sex couples.”136 But it went even further, 
asserting that the research “suggests that the traditional notion that 
children need a mother and a father to be raised into healthy, well-
adjusted adults is based more on stereotype than anything else.”137 
The opinion, however, cited no specific scientific studies. It 
highlighted that several well-known professional organizations have 
adopted statements favoring the conclusion that outcomes for 
children raised by same-sex couples do not differ significantly from 
outcomes for children raised by opposite-sex couples.138 Yet the 
statements of professional organizations are not themselves scientific 
studies and, as a matter of good science, cannot substitute for 
otherwise underdeveloped or inadequate studies.139 The Iowa 
opinion simply fails to overcome this reality reflected in the scientific 
studies: the evidence does not provide sufficient support for the 
 
 133. Id. at 524 n.15. 
 134. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 n.26 (Iowa 2009). 
 135. Id. at 873–74. 
 136. Id. at 899 n.26. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 874 (“Many leading organizations, including the American Academy of 
Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the 
National Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America, weighed the 
available research and supported the conclusion that gay and lesbian parents are as effective as 
heterosexual parents in raising children.”). See Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex 
Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339 (2002), available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/ 
reprint/pediatrics;109/2/339.pdf; Position Statement, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Doc. Ref. No. 
200214, Adoption and Coparenting by Same-Sex Couples (2002), available at 
http://www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/ 
PositionStatements/200214.aspx; Policy Statement, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Sexual 
Orientation, Parents, & Children, 60 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 499 (2004), available at 
http://www.apa.org/about/governance/council/policy/parenting.aspx. 
 139. See Declaration of Alan J. Hawkins as Expert Witness for Defendant at 8–9, Varnum 
v. Brien, No. CV 5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2007).  
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conclusion that same-sex parenting produces the same outcomes as 
married man-woman childrearing.140 
The Iowa opinion then moves to another tactic. It broadens the 
relevant government interest from “promoti[ng] . . . child rearing by 
a father and a mother in a marital relationship which social scientists 
say with confidence is the optimal milieu for child rearing” to 
promoting “the best interests of children.”141 This is not the first 
time that a court favoring redefinition has deployed such a tactic.142 
The tactic allows the court to lose sight of the institutional 
framework that supports the optimal child-rearing mode, focus 
instead on the needs of individual children, and then assert that 
limitation of marriage to one man and one woman does nothing to 
serve the interests of the children of same-sex couples. We address in 
some depth later in this Article the defects in this tactic.143  
2. “Responsible Procreation” and a Failure of Purpose 
Each of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions had to 
answer for a number of other social goods provided by the man-
woman meaning and therefore subject to loss upon redefinition. One 
of those is the second social good cataloged above, maximizing the 
private welfare provided to children conceived by passionate, 
heterosexual intercourse.  
[M]arriage is society’s mechanism to regulate and ameliorate the 
consequences of passionate and procreative heterosexual 
intercourse (that is, children). . . . By normalizing and privileging 
marriage as the situs for man-woman intercourse and thereby 
seeking to channel all heterosexual intercourse within that 
institution, society seeks to assure that when man-woman sex does 
 
 140. See supra note 122. Even leading, qualified proponents of genderless marriage have 
acknowledged the validity of the good-science requirements and the conclusion that studies 
showing “no differences” between child-rearing modes do not meet the good-science 
requirements. See William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and 
America’s Children, 15 MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELLBEING 97, 104 (2005) (“We do not 
know how the normative child in a same-sex family compares with other children. . . . Those 
who say the evidence falls short of showing that same-sex parenting is equivalent to opposite-
sex parenting (or better, or worse) are . . . right.”); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) 
Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 166 (2001).  
 141. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 96–63 (Mass. 2003); 
see also Stewart, Redefinition, supra note 12, at 67–68 (discussing Goodridge). 
 143. See infra Section III.B.2.a. 
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produce children, those children receive from birth onward the 
maximum amount of private welfare. . . . Marriage laws are not 
aimed at making all married sex procreative but only seek to 
encourage that all man-woman sex occurs in marriage, as a 
protection for when such sex is procreative—a protection for the 
baby, the often vulnerable mother, and society generally.144 
The responses of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions 
to the argument that the man-woman marriage institution is 
necessary to promote responsible procreation varied widely, from 
complete elision of the argument to a wild mischaracterization of the 
argument to the use of previously discredited counterarguments.145 
a. The uses of elision, mischaracterization, and discredited 
arguments. The Connecticut majority opinion elided the argument 
by noting that “the defendants expressly have disavowed any claim 
that the legislative decision to create a separate legal framework for 
committed same sex couples was motivated by the belief that . . . 
prohibiting same sex couples from marrying promotes responsible 
heterosexual procreation.”146 Just as before, the dissenting opinion of 
 
 144. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 344–45.  
 145. There is a rigorous and intellectually honest, although ultimately unsatisfactory, 
counter-argument. Linda McClain has contended that certain changes in American society, 
popularly called “the sexual revolution,” have eliminated the channeling of sex into marriage. 
Linda McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channeling Function of 
Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007). We will not repeat the critique made of 
McClain’s argument, see Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts and Critical Morality, supra 
note 81, at 56 n.193, because the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions do not use 
McClain’s argument directly. Moreover, the California majority opinion itself seems to suggest 
that channeling continues to be a productive purpose of marriage. See In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384, 431 (Cal. 2008) (“[A]n important purpose underlying marriage may be to 
channel procreation into a stable family relationship . . . .”). The courts likely avoid McClain’s 
argument because they do not want to be seen as bringing the sexual revolution, with its 
extremely uneven report card relative to social ills, into their redefinition project. See, e.g., W. 
Bradford Wilcox, Suffer the Little Children: Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonweal, in THE 
MEANING OF MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, AND MORALS 242–54 (Robert George & 
Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006); George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen, & Michael L. Katz, An 
Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277–317 
(1996). 
 146. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 478 (Conn. 2008). Elsewhere, 
however, the Connecticut majority opinion did address the argument, in relation to 
defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs are not similarly situated because of their inability to 
procreate. There, the Connecticut majority opinion acknowledged that “the state’s interest in 
regulating procreative conduct constitutes a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite sex 
couples,” but asserted that this interest was not determinative because: “we do not believe that 
[procreative] conduct so defines the institution of marriage that the inability to engage in that 
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Justice Zarella directly addressed the court’s elision, and through 
several pages of analysis and review of case law and relevant 
principles, concluded that the regulation of procreative conduct was 
a compelling interest that justified the perpetuation of the institution 
of man-woman marriage.147 In light of the detailed analysis by Justice 
Zarella, the substance of which was before the Connecticut court in 
amicus briefs, the decision to not even address this argument seems 
telling.  
The Iowa opinion addressed some argument relating to 
procreation but did so by use of a previously discounted 
counterargument. That counterargument begins by 
mischaracterizing the relevant social goods as being the promotion 
of more procreation: “government endorsement of traditional civil 
marriage will result in more procreation,” that procreation being 
necessary “to the continuation of the human race.”148 In similar 
fashion, the California majority opinion attempts to discount the 
importance of the social good by stating that “the promotion of 
procreation is not the sole or defining purpose of marriage.”149 But 
no responsible student of the marriage institution has said that it is. 
As just noted, the defensible understanding is that the man-woman 
marriage institution aims to “regulate and ameliorate the 
consequences” of heterosexual intercourse by channeling all such 
into that institution in an effort “to assure that when man-woman 
sex does produce children, those children receive from birth onward 
the maximum amount of private welfare.”150 The view that 
marriage’s purpose is to mandate or even promote procreation is 
“silly.”151 Yet it is on the basis of that silly view that, at least in part, 
both the Iowa opinion and the California majority opinion seek to 
obscure the potential loss of the second social good. But rather 
obviously, the meaningful question for the courts to grapple with is 
whether deinstitutionalizing man-woman marriage will further 
diminish provision of the second social good, honestly described. 
 
conduct is determinative of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for 
equal protection purposes, especially in view of the fact that some opposite sex couples also are 
unable to procreate, and others choose not to do so.” Id. at 424–25 n.19. 
 147. Id. at 528–32 (Zarella, J., dissenting). 
 148. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 901 (Iowa 2009). 
 149. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 150. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 344. 
 151. Id. 
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Although there is good reason to believe that it will,152 the 
California, Connecticut, and Iowa courts do not address that 
question.  
The California majority opinion relied primarily on another well-
worn counterargument but with a twist—a twist that illuminates the 
most essential flaw in the entire opinion. The opinion argued that 
government does not require man-woman couples to prove 
procreative capacity and intent before receipt of a marriage license or 
procreative conduct thereafter, so the inability of same-sex couples to 
procreate should not be for them, any more than for an infertile 
man-woman couple, a bar to marriage.153 The usual purpose of this 
counter-argument, at the superficial level, is to invoke a sense of 
injustice that similarly situated infertile couples are treated 
dissimilarly.154 At a more serious and a deeper level, this argument 
suggests that the second social good is of small importance to society 
and therefore that, even if the man-woman meaning is productive of 
the second social good, changing that meaning comes at little or no 
cost.155 This suggestion, however, is clearly false,156 and the 
California majority opinion did not adopt it. Indeed, the California 
majority stated that “promoting and facilitating a stable environment 
for the procreation and raising of children is unquestionably one of 
the vitally important purposes underlying the institution of 
marriage.”157 
 
 152. Compare Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 20–28, with INST. AM. VALUES, 
SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 65, at 12–32. 
 153. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431. The Iowa opinion also seems to reference this 
point, in at least some form, with the following statement, added as an afterthought to its main 
discussion of the illogic of promoting more procreation by excluding same-sex couples from 
the definition of marriage: “the statute is significantly under-inclusive with respect to the 
objective of increasing procreation because it does not include a variety of groups that do not 
procreate for reasons such as age, physical disability, or choice.” Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 902. 
 154. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco’s Consolidated Reply Brief at 36–37; In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999). 
 155. See, e.g., Stewart, Redefinition, supra note 12, at 41–42, 58–60. 
 156. See, e.g., INST. AM. VALUES, SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 65, at 12–32; see also 
INST. AM. VALUES, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 6–19 (2006); 
THE WITHERSPOON INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 21–43 
(2006), available at http://www.lulu.com/items/volume_23/330000/330163/3/print/8-
2-06_update_-_Princeton_Principles_BW_header_print_layout_final_6x9_desktop.pdf; Maggie 
Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal Justifications for the 
Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 451–71 
(2004).  
 157. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432. 
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What the majority opinion does is switch attention from “the 
vitally important purposes underlying the institution of marriage” 
(including provision of the second social good) to the court’s notion 
of “the scope of the constitutional right to marry.”158 This is a new 
and different project and is sufficiently important that it warrants 
separate treatment, which comes in the next subsection. For now, it 
suffices to say that the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions, 
though varying in the candor of their analysis, are equally 
unsuccessful in establishing the no-downside argument relative to 
the second social good, that of maximizing the private welfare 
provided to children conceived by heterosexual sex. Only the 
California opinion directly addresses the relevant social good, and 
that opinion acknowledges that “promoting and facilitating a stable 
environment for the procreation and raising of children is 
unquestionably one of the vitally important purposes underlying the 
institution of marriage,”159 while failing to give plausible reason why 
redefinition will not place that valuable social good in jeopardy. 
b. The “right to marry” versus access to the marriage institution. As 
just noted, the California majority opinion does not adopt the 
argument that, even if the man-woman meaning is productive of the 
second social good, suppression of that meaning comes at little or no 
cost. Indeed, that opinion places a high value on the second social 
good. What the majority opinion does—and this is the illuminating 
twist—is switch attention from “the vitally important purposes 
underlying the institution of marriage” (including provision of the 
second social good) to the court’s notion of “the scope of the 
constitutional right to marry.”160 Suddenly, the court is no longer 
seeking to bolster its no-downside argument by somehow 
minimizing or otherwise explaining away the second social good; 
rather, it is now focusing on what it deems to be the great upside of 
its holding—by extending to same-sex couples the “right to marry,” 
that holding is granting them access to the historically valued and 
valuable marriage institution.  
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (noting that the state “undeniably has a legitimate interest in promoting 
‘responsible procreation’” but then concluding that this “interest cannot be viewed as a valid 
basis for defining or limiting the class of persons who may claim the protection of the 
fundamental constitutional right to marry”). 
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That switch leads to these arguments, which require a rather full 
quotation:  
 Whether or not the state’s interest in encouraging responsible 
procreation properly can be viewed as a reasonably conceivable 
justification for the statutory limitation of marriage to a man and a 
woman . . . this interest clearly does not provide an appropriate 
basis for defining or limiting the scope of the constitutional right to 
marry. None of the past cases discussing the right to marry—and 
identifying this right as one of the fundamental elements of 
personal autonomy and liberty protected by our Constitution—
contains any suggestion that the constitutional right to marry is 
possessed only by individuals who are at risk of producing children 
accidentally, or implies that this constitutional right is not equally 
important for and guaranteed to responsible individuals who can be 
counted upon to take appropriate precautions in planning for 
parenthood. Thus, although the state undeniably has a legitimate 
interest in promoting “responsible procreation,” that interest 
cannot be viewed as a valid basis for defining or limiting the class of 
persons who may claim the protection of the fundamental 
constitutional right to marry. 
 . . . The personal enrichment afforded by the right to marry may 
be obtained by a couple whether or not they choose to have 
children, and the right to marry never has been limited to those 
who plan or desire to have children.161  
In their context, these arguments shine a bright light on “the 
right to marry” repeatedly referenced by the California majority 
opinion.162 These arguments, unavoidably it seems, raise several 
questions: If “vitally important purposes underlying the institution of 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. In the opinion’s relatively short introductory section, “the right to marry” appears 
thirteen times. Id. at 399–402. In the first substantive section on the constitutional issue it 
appears eighty-three times, with at least that many references to the right by other language. 
Id. at 419–34 (Section IV.A). Moreover, the majority opinion itself identifies its “first” task as 
“determin[ing] the nature and scope of the ‘right to marry.’” Id. at 399. In some respects, this 
extensive early focus is understandable for reasons beyond the obvious relevance of the nature 
and scope of the right to marry. For one, the right to marry is a legal construct and, as such, 
something within the control of judges. Although elementary, it bears repeating that but for 
use of the formal amendment process, a state’s highest court’s exercise of that control is 
absolute with respect to rights seen to arise in the state constitution, just as the United States 
Supreme Court’s control is absolute with respect to federal constitutional rights. Quite simply, 
such control is the practical meaning of Marbury v. Madison’s famous declaration that it is for 
the courts to “say what the law is.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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marriage” do not serve, indeed cannot be allowed to serve, as a 
“basis for defining or limiting the scope of the constitutional right to 
marry,”163 what exactly can and does so serve? Is it really “the right 
to marry” that “afford[s]” “personal enrichment,” or is it something 
bigger, richer, and deeper than that legal construct, such as 
participation in the social institution of marriage itself? The most 
important question, however, is simply: What does the California 
majority opinion mean when it refers to the “right to marry”? 
As to that most important question, the California majority 
opinion gives this answer: 
[T]he constitutionally based right to marry . . . encompass[es] the 
core set of basic substantive legal rights and attributes traditionally 
associated with marriage that are so integral to an individual’s 
liberty and personal autonomy that they may not be eliminated or 
abrogated by the Legislature or by the electorate through the 
statutory initiative process. These core substantive rights include, 
most fundamentally, the opportunity of an individual to establish—
with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share his 
or her life—an officially recognized and protected family possessing 
mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the same respect 
and dignity accorded a union traditionally designated as 
marriage.164 
That ponderous answer can be fairly shortened to this: The right to 
marry is the right to enter into the social institution of marriage. After 
all, as the California majority opinion asserts elsewhere,165 the only 
way for a couple to get “the same respect and dignity accorded a 
union traditionally designated as marriage” is to be a part of the 
same large social endeavor productive of such respect and dignity, 
and that is the social institution of marriage. The majority opinion 
 
 163. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432. 
 164. Id. at 399. 
 165. Id. at 434 (“[O]ne of the core elements of this fundamental right is the right of 
same-sex couples to have their official family relationship accorded the same dignity, respect, 
and stature as that accorded to all other officially recognized family relationships.”); id. at 434–
35 (asserting that legislation creating domestic partnerships, or civil unions, “pose[s] a serious 
risk of denying the official family relationship of same-sex couples the equal dignity and respect 
that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry”); id. at 444 (“[O]ne of the core 
elements embodied in the state constitutional right to marry is the right of an individual and a 
couple to have their own official family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that 
accorded the family relationship of other couples.”); id. at 446 (speaking of “the fundamental 
interest of same-sex couples in having their official family relationship accorded dignity and 
respect equal to that conferred upon the family relationship of opposite-sex couples”). 
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itself makes clear this nexus between equal dignity and entry into the 
institution:  
[A]ffording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution 
of domestic partnership, and denying such couples access to the 
established institution of marriage, properly must be viewed as 
impinging upon the right of those couples to have their family 
relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded 
the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.166  
Although that “established institution” is pre-political, in our society 
the law is the gatekeeper to it; the law does not create the institution 
but does say who may enter. The constitutional right to marry is 
what polices the gatekeeper’s decisions, requiring compliance with 
constitutional norms.  
The opinion’s enthusiasm, however, to discuss the right to 
marry—what it is, its nature, and its scope—is paired with its rather 
startling lack of enthusiasm to thoughtfully address marriage—what 
it is. Of course, what marriage is is a question of fact, and facts are 
stubborn things. Unlike rights, they are not subject to nearly the 
same level of judicial control, and the complex web of facts 
comprising the phenomenon of contemporary American marriage is 
not within the comfort zone of those trained only in the law.167 But 
still, an analysis of the right to marry, if severed from the 
phenomenon of marriage, can be considered neither serious nor 
honest—unless the phenomenon of marriage is nothing more than 
the legal construct of the right itself. But neither the California 
majority opinion (nor the Connecticut or Iowa opinions, for that 
matter) nor any serious marriage scholar plainly asserts that the 
phenomenon of contemporary American marriage is nothing more 
 
 166. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). The majority opinion reaffirms that nexus elsewhere: 
Although past California cases emphasize that marriage is an institution in which 
society as a whole has a vital interest, our decisions at the same time recognize that 
the legal right and opportunity to enter into such an officially recognized 
relationship also is of overriding importance to the individual and to the affected 
couple. 
Id. at 424 (emphasis added). 
 167. See Gallagher, Reply, supra note 74, at 34 (“[F]or many years, the same-sex 
marriage debate has been a legal debate, mostly confined to lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, 
few of whom have any particular background in marriage at all.”); Stewart, Marriage Facts, 
supra note 19, at 315 (“[T]he treatment of constitutional facts in recent American appellate 
court decisions addressing the marriage issue has been confused and even careless.”) (footnote 
omitted).  
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than such a legal construct. The California opinion does discuss what 
marriage is to a small extent, but, as noted earlier, when it does it 
follows the narrow description or close personal relationship 
model.168 
The Connecticut and Iowa opinions more clearly manifest the 
attempt to bring plaintiffs within the institution of marriage, not 
merely grant them an abstract right to marry. Plaintiffs in both cases 
framed their arguments around entrance into the social institution. 
The Connecticut opinion stated that plaintiffs contend that 
“marriage is not simply a term denominating a bundle of legal rights 
. . . . [I]t is an institution of unique and enduring importance in our 
society, one that carries with it a special status.”169 Similarly, the 
Iowa opinion described plaintiffs as “complaining of their exclusion 
from the institution of civil marriage.”170 Both opinions recognized 
(even if only in this one instance) the institutional nature of 
marriage, it having a “long and celebrated history,” bolstered by 
“the widespread understanding that this word describes a family 
relationship unreservedly sanctioned by the community.”171 The 
institution was described as being a “social resource of irreplaceable 
value to those to whom it is offered” (Connecticut opinion)172 and as 
“providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental 
relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society” 
(Iowa opinion).173 It was clear in both cases that the court and the 
plaintiffs believed that the right to marry meant the right to enter the 
institution of marriage. Both courts aimed to allow “gay and lesbian 
people full access to the institution of civil marriage.”174 
The concept of value also reinforces the understanding that the 
right to marry is the right to enter into the social institution of 
 
 168. See supra Part II. 
 169. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 416 (Conn. 2008). The 
Connecticut opinion also cited favorably Connecticut law: “Marriage, therefore, is not merely 
shorthand for a discrete set of legal rights and responsibilities but is ‘one of the most 
fundamental of human relationships . . . .’” Id. at 417 (citing Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574, 577 
(Conn. 1934)). 
 170. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 897 (Iowa 2009). 
 171. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 474. 
 172. Id. at 418 n.15 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 24, 30).  
 173. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883 (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 
1983)). 
 174. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 907. 
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marriage. Regardless of their position on the marriage issue, 
informed observers of marriage agree that both the societal and the 
personal value, rewards, and benefits of marriage are to be found in 
its institutional nature.175 Here is genderless marriage proponent 
Ronald Dworkin’s explanation: 
The institution of marriage is unique; it is a distinct mode of 
association and commitment that carries centuries and volumes of 
social and personal meaning. We can no more create an alternative 
mode of commitment carrying a parallel intensity of meaning than 
we can create a substitute for poetry or for love. The status of 
marriage is therefore a social resource of irreplaceable value to 
those to whom it is offered; it enables two people together to 
create value in their lives that they could not create if that 
institution had never existed.176 
It is those “centuries and volumes of social and personal meaning,” 
of course, that make the marriage institution, for its participants, a 
font of the respect and dignity central to the notion of the right to 
marry.177 Likewise, it is those same “centuries and volumes of social 
and personal meaning” that produce the social goods articulated by 
Bruce Hafen and Mary Ann Glendon,178 as well as those catalogued 
earlier in this section.179  
Indeed, the California majority opinion puts its own imprimatur 
on this nexus between value and entry into the institution and does 
so by favorably quoting Bruce Hafen, who spoke of the institutions 
of marriage and family as “mediating structures.”180 The California 
majority opinion quotes him thus: “Mediating structures are ‘the 
value-generating and value maintaining agencies in society.’”181 An 
analysis of mediating structures reveals that the family is “the major 
institution within the private sphere, and thus for many people the 
most valuable thing in their lives.”182 In short, the value, both societal 
 
 175. Compare Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 8–10, 15–20, with RONALD 
DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 86 (2006). 
 176. DWORKIN, supra note 175, at 86; see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418 (quoting 
similarly from Dworkin). 
 177. See DWORKIN, supra note 175, at 86. 
 178. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 180. Hafen, supra note 98, at 479. 
 181. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424 n.38 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Hafen, supra 
note 98, at 479). 
 182. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 424 n.38 (emphasis added) (quoting Hafen, supra note 
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and personal, is in the institution. The right to marry is valuable only 
because participation in the social institution is valuable and the right 
facilitates that participation. As an abstraction, that right has no value 
in itself. If all the legal incidents of marriage were otherwise available 
and marriage had ceased to be a social institution but had become 
merely one among many coequal lifestyles, no rational person would 
spend a penny on lawyers’ fees to vindicate a “right to marry.”  
It is only in the context of this concept of value that the 
California majority opinion seems at times to suggest that the right 
to marry is something other than the right to enter into, and 
participate equally in, the social institution of marriage. As noted, the 
majority opinion’s twist on the well-worn procreative 
capacity/intention argument is to say that procreative 
capacity/intention has nothing to do with the right to marry, 
although, admittedly, the regulation of procreativity (the second 
social good) has very much to do with the marriage institution 
extant in our society. Yet this severance of right from institution 
raises an important question regarding the locus of value: Whether it 
is the right to marry or really the institution that affords to the 
individual “personal enrichment”183 and the “opportunity to live a 
happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member of society.”184 
The California majority opinion in one place says that it is the right 
to marry185 and in another place strongly suggests that it is.186 But 
that notion is clearly wrong, for the reasons just given. A right to 
enter a dead institution affords precious little personal enrichment. 
Rather, the valued personal enrichment comes from participation in 
the “vital social institution”187 itself. And elsewhere, contrary to its 
other suggestions but quite clearly, the California majority opinion 
 
98, at 480). Regarding the nexus between value and the marriage institution, the California 
majority opinion also speaks of “the long and celebrated history of the term ‘marriage’ and the 
widespread understanding that this term describes a union unreservedly approved and favored 
by the community.” Id. at 445. 
 183. Id. at 432. 
 184. Id. at 427. 
 185. Id. at 432 (“The personal enrichment afforded by the right to marry may be 
obtained by a couple whether or not they choose to have children . . . .”). 
 186. See id. at 427 (“In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights 
embodied in the right to marry—and their central importance to an individual’s opportunity to 
live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member of society—the California 
Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all individuals 
and couples, without regard to their sexual orientation.”). 
 187. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
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acknowledges as much. After describing the various social goods 
which civil marriage can provide, it notes that  
although past California cases emphasize that marriage is an 
institution in which society as a whole has a vital interest, our 
decisions at the same time recognize that the legal right and 
opportunity to enter into such an officially recognized relationship 
also is of overriding importance to the individual and to the 
affected couple.188 
Something else reinforces the understanding that the California 
majority opinion’s right to marry is correctly understood as the right 
to enter into, and equally participate in, the social institution of 
marriage. That “something else” consists of the very cases on which 
the majority opinion relies to justify its right to marry. In the process 
of being so used, those cases make clear that, first, the law does not 
create the marriage institution but merely facilitates its functioning 
and perpetuation and, second, both the societal and the personal 
value is to be found in the institution. Thus, those cases reference 
 
 “the public interest in the institution of marriage” with its link 
to “[t]he family [as] the basic unit of our society, the center 
of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human 
life,” which “channels biological drives that might otherwise 
become socially destructive”; “ensures the care and education 
of children in a stable environment”; “establishes continuity 
from one generation to another”; and “nurtures and 
develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free 
people”;189 
 
 
 188. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 424. Other language in the majority opinion reinforces 
this understanding that the right to marry is the right to enter into the marriage institution. 
See, e.g., id. at 401 (referring to “denying such couples access to the familiar and highly favored 
designation of marriage”); id. at 402 (arguing that “excluding same-sex couples from the legal 
institution of marriage is likely to be viewed as reflecting” negatively on them); id. at 426 n.42 
(referring to “a right of access to the expressive and material benefits that the state affords to 
the institution of marriage” (emphasis removed) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to 
Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083–84 (2005))); id. at 445 (referring to “denying such 
couples access to the established institution of marriage”). 
 189. DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1952), quoted in Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d at 422. 
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 “the well-established public policy to foster and promote the 
institution of marriage”;190 
 
 the understanding both that “the structure of society itself 
largely depends upon the institution of marriage” and that 
“marriage is at once the most socially productive and 
individually fulfilling relationship”;191 
 
 a view of “marriage [as] an institution which the State not 
only must allow, but which always and in every age it has 
fostered and protected”;192 and  
 
 the nexus between the law’s promotional role relative to 
marriage, on one hand, and, on the other hand, marriage’s 
institutional nature, not being “based on anachronistic 
notions of morality” but “‘rooted in the necessity of providing 
an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational 
rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.’”193 
 
As already seen, the California majority opinion’s most focused 
language is consistent with these references from the cases on which 
it relies. And tellingly, the majority opinion never makes the silly 
assertion found in other judicial opinions favorable to genderless 
marriage—that the law is the creator of the vital social institution of 
marriage.194 Nor do the Connecticut and Iowa opinions make this 
 
 190. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976), cited in Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 422. 
 191. Id., quoted in part in Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422. 
 192. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 426. 
 193. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988), quoted in Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 422. 
 194. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) 
(“We begin by considering the nature of civil marriage itself. Simply put, the government 
creates civil marriage. . . . [C]ivil marriage is . . . precisely what its name implies: a wholly 
secular institution.”); Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
(Saxe, J., dissenting) (“Civil marriage is an institution created by the state . . . .”); Andersen v. 
King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1018 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exclusionary 
language [that is, a man-woman meaning] . . . does not lend the institution of marriage its power. 
Rather, marriage draws its strength from the nature of the civil marriage contract itself and the 
recognition of that contract by the State.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 1034 (Bridge, J., dissenting) 
(“Civil marriage is a state-conferred legal status, the existence of which gives rise to benefits and burdens 
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mistake. In these ways, the approach taken by these courts is 
consistent with Joseph Raz’s insight into the role of the law relative 
to pre-political social institutions such as marriage—that is the role of 
facilitator, not creator.195 
In short, both to be meaningful and to be consistent with its 
own logic and language and that of the cases on which it relies, the 
right to marry repeatedly referenced by the California majority 
opinion must be understood as simply the right to enter into the 
social institution of marriage, as was explicitly stated by the 
Connecticut and Iowa opinions. And everywhere implicit in these 
opinions’ discussion of the right to marry is the unproven 
assumption that, by decreeing same-sex couples possessed of that 
right, the law thereby ushers them into the institution “traditionally 
designated as marriage.”196 That is a fundamental premise in all three 
opinions, and it is almost certainly false. 
A number of social institutional realities falsify the fundamental 
premise that giving same-sex couples the right to marry will also 
provide them the right to the institution of marriage, many of which 
have been discussed previously but are summarized here. First, a 
social institution is constituted by, and really only by, a complex web 
of widely shared public meanings, including understandings and 
norms.197 A core meaning constitutive of the contemporary 
California, Connecticut, Iowa, and American institution of marriage 
(as in virtually all other societies at all other times since pre-history) 
is “the union of a man and a woman.”198 Although denominated 
“marriage,” a regime or institution constituted by the competing 
and supplanting meaning of “the union of any two persons” must of 
necessity be a radically different institution.199 As noted earlier, the 
law has the power to suppress the man-woman meaning, thereby 
destroying its ubiquitous nature, and consequently to unmake 
(deinstitutionalize) the institution “traditionally designated as 
marriage.”200 The law also has the power to force the any-two-
 
reserved exclusively to the citizens engaged in the marital relationship.”) (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993)). 
 195. RAZ, supra note 74, at 161. 
 196. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399. 
 197. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 200. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399; see also supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
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persons meaning into many, probably most, sectors of society.201 But 
the law is powerless to usher same-sex couples into the institution 
“traditionally designated as marriage” and thus is powerless to afford 
them the respect and dignity and other social goods uniquely 
provided by the man-woman marriage institution. This 
powerlessness is a function of fact and reality. John and James cannot 
enter into the institution of marriage unless and until the law 
suppresses its core man-woman meaning and replaces it with the 
any-two-persons meaning, but this very act of replacement results in 
a radically different institution.  
This reality has been clear for some time now. Professor Bix has 
argued that “[m]arriage is an existing social institution” and an 
“existing ‘social good.’” 202 The “complication” in the analysis, such 
as that used in the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions, “is 
that one cannot fully distinguish the terms on which the good is 
available from the nature of the good.”203 He also quotes Joseph Raz 
who asserted that  
When people demand recognition of gay marriages, they usually 
mean to demand access to an existing good. In fact they also ask 
for the transformation of that good. For there can be no doubt that 
the recognition of gay marriage will effect as great a transformation 
in the nature of marriage as that from polygamous to monogamous 
or from arranged to unarranged marriage.204  
With due deference to the estimable Professor Raz, the 
transformation will be greater than even he suggests. As noted 
elsewhere,  
The very act of legal of legal redefinition will radically transform the 
old institution and make it into a profoundly different institution, 
one whose meanings, value, and vitality are speculative. Some 
same-sex couples look to the law to let them into the privileged 
institution, and the law may want to, but it cannot; it can only give 
them access to a different institution of different value.205 
 
 201. See Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 47–49. 
 202. Brian Bix, Reflections on the Nature of Marriage, in REVITALIZING THE 
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111, 112 (Alan J. Hawkins et 
al. eds., 2002). 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 112–13 (quoting RAZ, supra note 74, at 161). 
 205. Stewart, Judicial Elision, supra note 58, at 26. 
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These realities falsify the fundamental premise at the core of the 
three opinions’ central project. The purpose of that central project, 
of course, is to give to same-sex couples the same right to enter the 
same valued and valuable social institution of marriage that man-
woman couples have historically had the right to enter. And that 
central project’s means is to expand the “constitutional right to 
marry” to include same-sex couples. The false fundamental premise 
is that the court can, by those means, accomplish that purpose. But 
the court cannot do so, by those or any other means. Although 
potent to destroy the institution “traditionally designated as 
marriage,” the law, as a matter of social reality, is impotent to do 
what the three opinions purport to be doing. It is in this way that 
the use of a false fundamental premise leads not just to a holding 
unworthy of respect but to a breathtaking failure of the central 
project of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions. 
The one effort to counter this conclusion of failure does not 
succeed. Each of the three opinions asserts, in some form or another, 
that its actions will not work any change on the institution of 
marriage. Speaking of the same-sex couples who, as plaintiffs in the 
case, are asking for the “constitutional right to marry,” the California 
opinion says “that we recognize they are not seeking to create a new 
constitutional right—the right to ‘same-sex marriage’—or to change, 
modify, or (as some have suggested) ‘deinstitutionalize’ the existing 
institution of marriage.”206 It is of course accurate to say that the 
plaintiffs were not seeking “the right to ‘same-sex marriage.’” Such a 
right does not exist anywhere in the world, because nowhere is 
marriage defined as “the union of two persons of the same sex.” 
Rather, it is defined either as “the union of a man and a woman” or 
as “the union of any two persons.” What the plaintiffs were seeking, 
without cavil, is the right to genderless marriage, the only form of 
marriage actually available to them. To repeat the obvious: John and 
James cannot enter into marriage unless and until the law suppresses 
its man-woman meaning and replaces it with the any-two-persons 
meaning. That act of replacement creates a genderless marriage 
regime, and, again, that is exactly what the plaintiffs were seeking. 
Similarly, the Connecticut majority opinion follows the same 
path by quoting approvingly of similar language from 
Massachusetts’s Goodridge opinion: “[B]roadening civil marriage to 
 
 206. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 421 (Cal. 2008). 
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include same-sex couples . . . [will] not disturb the fundamental 
value of marriage . . . . ” Neither will it “diminish the validity or 
dignity of opposite-sex marriage . . . . If anything, extending civil 
marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage 
to individuals and communities.”207 It also quotes the California 
opinion in stating that redefinition “will not alter the substantive 
nature of the legal institution of marriage.”208 The Iowa opinion 
adopts the belief that “[t]here is no legitimate notion that a more 
inclusive definition of marriage will transform civil marriage into 
something less than it presently is.”209 Each of these opinions’ 
assertions attempts to establish the innocuous nature of redefinition.  
These assertions track, and in the case of the Connecticut 
majority opinion, directly quote,210 virtually identical assertions in 
Massachusetts’s Goodridge opinion211 and Ontario’s Halpern 
decision,212 both of which mandate redefinition. In Goodridge the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court argues that the institution of 
marriage will not change because “the plaintiffs seek only to be 
married, not to undermine the institution of civil marriage.”213 
Further, the court explained that the fact that “same-sex couples are 
willing to embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, 
mutual support, and commitment to one another is a testament to 
the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human 
spirit.”214 Halpern follows the same path: “The Couples are not 
seeking to abolish the institution of marriage; they are seeking access 
to it.”215  
However, the intentions of same-sex couples not to undermine 
marriage are irrelevant to the outcome; “it seems nonsensical that 
the intentions of a handful of people could insulate a vast social 
institution constituted by its public meanings from change resulting 
 
 207. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 474 (Conn. 2008) (quoting 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)). 
 208. Id. at 473 (citing Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 451). 
 209. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 n.25 (Iowa 2009) (citing Benjamin G. 
Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-
Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2388 (2007)). 
 210. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 474.  
 211. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941. 
 212. Halpern v. Toronto (City) (2003), 225 D.L.R. 4th 529 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 213. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 4th at 566.  
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from a profound alteration in those meanings.”216 Further, as noted 
earlier, the truth of this argument can also be challenged in that 
many of those supporting genderless marriage do intend to 
undermine the institution.217  
The opinions’ argument of “no change in the marriage 
institution,” cast in terms of the intent of the plaintiffs, thus cannot 
be taken seriously. Nor, for the same reasons, can it be taken 
seriously when made in the slightly different form adopted by the 
California majority opinion: “[P]ermitting same-sex couples access 
to the designation of marriage . . . will not alter the legal framework 
of the institution of marriage.”218 To be plain, changing the law so 
that it no longer sustains but rather suppresses a core meaning 
constitutive of “the institution of marriage” and then replaces that 
meaning with a meaning so radically different as to create an 
essentially different social institution does indeed alter the 
institution’s “legal framework.”  
In sum, the three opinions not only fail to negate the downside 
of loss of the marriage institution’s second catalogued social good 
(maximizing the private welfare provided to children conceived by 
passionate, heterosexual sex), they fail to achieve their promised but 
illusory upside (access of same-sex couples to the historically valuable 
and valued marriage institution). 
3. The child’s bonding right 
The first social good catalogued earlier is the child’s bonding 
right. That is the right of every child to know and be reared by his or 
her own biological parents, with exceptions made only in the best 
interests of the child, not in the interests of any adult. This social 
good is one for which the nexus between the man-woman meaning 
at the core of the marriage institution and the social good cannot 
rationally be contested.219 Indeed, but for the institutionalization of 
 
 216. Stewart, Redefinition, supra note 12, at 79.  
 217. Id.  
 218. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008). 
 219. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 201: 
[S]ame-sex marriage would require us in both law and culture to deny the double 
origin of the child. . . . It would require us to change or ignore our basic human 
rights documents, which announce clearly, and for vitally important reasons, that 
every child has a birthright to her own two natural parents. . . . But a society that 
embraces same-sex marriage can no longer collectively embrace this norm 
[embedded in the child’s bonding right] and must take specific steps to retract it. 
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the man-woman meaning, what is now an internationally recognized 
human right will become merely a fortuitous accident.220 Moreover, 
to legally redefine marriage as the union of any two persons is to 
officially retract that right.221 For these reasons, the child’s bonding 
right stands as the single strongest refutation of the no-downside 
argument. Importantly for present purposes and as noted earlier, the 
prevailing California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions advance the 
no-downside argument more forcefully and frequently than any 
other judicial opinion favorable to genderless marriage,222 so the key 
question becomes how these opinions deal with the child’s bonding 
right.  
A good first step in answering that question is to examine the 
nexus between the institutionalized man-woman meaning and the 
child’s bonding right. The word right is key. Many use the word as a 
grand way to summarize a preferred public policy: “Every child has a 
right to be immunized against polio.” Or as a grand way to advocate 
for a desired political outcome: “No government should stand in the 
way of a capable, loving adult’s right to a child.” We do neither. 
Rather, relative to the child’s bonding right, we are speaking of 
something that already-existing positive law recognizes not only as a 
right but one with corresponding duties in at least some actors. The 
literature identifies such a right both in international human rights 
documents223 and in domestic law supportive of what is aptly called 
“bionormativity”—the norm that parental rights and obligations align 
with biological parenthood.224 Both sources treat the child as a right-
holder or, at least, as a possessor of significant affected interests.225 
Yet even such legal recognition, alone, cannot be sufficient to 
make the right meaningful in the lives of real children. There must 
be something that we call “social predicates.” The following thought 
 
One can believe in same-sex marriage. One can believe that every child deserves a 
mother and a father. One cannot believe both. 
 220. For analysis of the child’s bonding right as an internationally recognized human 
right, see id. at 180–83, 188–90. 
 221. See id. at 201. 
 222. See supra notes 90–92. 
 223. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 180–83, 188–90; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The child shall . . . [have] the 
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 
GA. L. REV. 649, 653–54 (2008).  
 225. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 188–202; Baker, supra note 224, at 682–91. 
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experiment helps explain: Imagine an island queendom where all the 
inhabitants view every form of property, both tangible and 
intangible, as belonging to all equally. In other words, they hold all 
property in common. Thus, there is no social institution of private 
property; indeed, the language available to the inhabitants is rather 
ill-equipped to convey the notion of private property. One day, 
however, a bit of parchment washes up on the beach and is taken to 
the queen. She correctly interprets the legible portion to say: “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” Acting on the intuition that this statement is the 
product of a wise and just society, she duly and formally elevates 
those words to positive law in her own queendom. And life goes on 
unchanged, for although the law now recognizes the “right,” it is a 
meaningless “right” because an essential social predicate is missing. 
That missing predicate, of course, is the social institution of private 
property. 
The predicate required for the child’s bonding right to be 
meaningful must be some social mechanism or institution that, with 
some effectiveness, channels “the erotic and interpersonal impulses 
between men and women in a particular direction: one in which men 
and women commit to each other and to the children that their 
sexual unions commonly (and even at times unexpectedly) 
produce.”226 Or stated slightly differently, there must be some social 
mechanism or institution that “sustain[s] enduring bonds between 
women and men in order to give a baby its mother and father, to 
bond them to one another and to the baby.”227 Without such a social 
institution, a law conveying to every child in the polity the bonding 
right is a law recognizing something that is, quite literally, 
meaningless. Such a law would seem to be the product of either 
delusion or fraud.  
That essential social predicate to the child’s bonding right has 
been present in virtually all cultures since prehistory. It is, of course, 
marriage as a vital social institution.  
In all or nearly all human societies, marriage is socially approved 
sexual intercourse between a woman and a man, conceived both as 
a personal relationship and as an institution, primarily such that any 
children resulting from the union are–and are understood by the 
 
 226. COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 21, at 12. 
 227. Id. at 13. 
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society to be–emotionally, morally, practically, and legally affiliated 
with both of the parents.228 
Marriage provides this social good in the same fundamental way that 
any important social institution provides any of its unique social 
goods: The complex web of widely shared public meanings 
constituting the institution teaches, forms, and transforms 
individuals, providing to them “identities, purposes, practices, 
projects[,]” and, importantly, possibilities.229 In this this way, the 
institution guides behavior.230 As marriage is “[s]ociety’s best and 
perhaps only effective means to secure the right of a child to know 
and be raised by his or her biological parents,”231 the marriage 
institution constructs the only social reality wherein the child’s 
bonding right can be both comprehensible and meaningful.  
Of necessity, then, a society without the man-woman marriage 
institution will be devoid of any law-recognized “right” like the 
child’s bonding right—not because of the enactment or repeal of 
some law but because, at a more fundamental level, the social reality 
precludes the very notion of such a right. To say that marriage 
defined as the union of a man and a woman is the only social 
mechanism that can put the first breath of life into the child’s 
bonding right is not to say that such marriage’s presence in a society 
in itself compels consent to full vindication of the child’s bonding 
right. But it is to say, quite emphatically, that the man-woman 
marriage institution is the essential social predicate to the right’s 
existence.  
Regarding these understandings from the new institutionalism 
and their application to the marriage institution, real-life experience 
 
 228. BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 91. Blankenhorn notes that the quoted definition 
“rests on a large and growing mountain of scholarly evidence. It incorporates widely shared 
conclusions about the meaning of marriage reached by the leading anthropologists, historians, 
and sociologists of the modern era.” Id. 
 229. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 320–21; see also DeCoste, supra note 73, 
at 625–26; supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of this 
theory of the “new institutionalism”).  
 230. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 62, at 50: 
Many treatments of institutions emphasize their capacity to control and constrain 
behavior. Institutions impose restrictions by defining legal, moral, and cultural 
boundaries, setting off legitimate from illegitimate activities. However, it is essential 
to recognize that institutions also support and empower activities and actors. 
Institutions provide guidelines and resources for taking action as well as prohibitions 
and constraints on action. 
 231. Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 321.  
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validates them. Where marriage is a strong social institution, it is 
much more likely that a child knows and is raised by the man and the 
woman whose sexual union created her, exactly because the parents 
are married.232 Where the institution is weaker, such an outcome is 
less likely.233 Where the marriage ethos is weak or nonexistent, 
whenever a child does know and is raised by his mother and father, 
such is a mere fortuity—unless the society has expended resources in 
a way effective to otherwise involve the father in the child’s life, a 
problematic undertaking.234 
These realities regarding the nexus between the marriage 
institution, with its core meaning of the union of a man and woman, 
and the child’s bonding right lead to an important understanding, 
one having to do with legal recognition of that right. The law’s role 
relative to marriage and other pre-political institutions is “to give 
them formal recognition, bring legal and administrative 
arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use by members of 
the community who wish to do so, and encourage the transmission 
of belief in their value to future generations.” 235 Although the law 
has power to suppress the man-woman meaning,236 the law does not 
create pre-political institutions like marriage but facilitates them,237 
and historically the law has facilitated the marriage institution by 
reinforcing the man-woman meaning at its core. Because that 
institutionalized meaning is the essential social predicate to, and 
actualizes as a practical matter, the child’s bonding right, each law 
sustaining such marriage operates to recognize that right. To say 
 
 232. See, e.g., INST. AM. VALUES, SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 65, at 12–15 (“Marriage, 
and a normative commitment to marriage, foster high-quality relationships between . . . 
parents and children.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Patrick Heuveline et al., Shifting Childrearing to Single Mothers: Results 
From 17 Western Countries, 29 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 47 (2003) (collecting evidence 
that the spread of cohabitation results in more family instability and more single parenthood). 
 234. Generally speaking, Sweden’s experience is one of “the deliberate political 
elimination of marriage as a meaningful legal and social institution” coupled with some state 
initiatives to involve the father in the lives of his children. See Allan Carlson, Deconstruction of 
Marriage: The Swedish Case, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 153, 154 (2007).  
 235. RAZ, supra note 74, at 161; see DeCoste, supra note 73, at 635.  
 236. See supra notes 69–70. 
 237. RAZ, supra note 74, at 161 (noting that political action can be taken to support 
political institutions “to give them formal recognition, bring legal and administrative 
arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use by members of the community who wish 
to do so, and encourage the transmission of belief in their value to future generations”).  
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otherwise is to say that the law has for centuries been oblivious to its 
own consequences or that the law is irrational or both.  
The current legal reality across the United States, and especially 
in Canada, is that some law sustains the child’s bonding right and 
some law undermines it. The present situation in Canada provides 
perhaps the starkest example of this legal schizophrenia. On one 
hand, Canada is signatory to the United Nation’s Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.238 Although other international human rights 
instruments reference and are protective of the child’s bonding 
right,239 the Convention is probably the single most potent 
instrument in that respect.240 On the other hand, Canadian law not 
only has withdrawn legal support for the man-woman meaning but 
has become affirmatively hostile to that meaning, insisting on the 
any-two-persons meaning for all public purposes.241 The simple fact 
is that Canada has not yet grappled with and resolved this conflict in 
its own laws.242 All this sustains the understanding that, in both the 
United States and Canada in the coming years, the great human 
rights contest, at both the legal and the larger social level, will be 
over the fate of the child’s bonding right. Certainly that fate has not 
yet been finally determined in either country. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that in California, Connecticut, and 
Iowa, at least up until issuance of the recent opinions, the man-
woman marriage institution was productive of the social good here 
called the child’s bonding right. The no-downside argument fails in 
the face of that reality, yet each of these opinions rely heavily on that 
argument.243 In doing so, they do not expressly deny that such a 
right exists; to the authors’ knowledge, no genderless marriage 
proponent ever has, publicly. Nor could these opinions plausibly 
 
 238. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(“The child shall . . . [have] the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”). All 
member states except the United States and Somalia have ratified the Convention. See Johan 
D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal Justice, 
and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 778 (2001). 
 239. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 179–83. 
 240. See id. at 188–89. 
 241. Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33 (Can.). 
 242. It is also true that marriage as the union of a man and a woman is still 
institutionalized in Canada. Those unhappy with that social fact, and it is a fact, may murmur 
about “institutional lag,” how an essential component of the institution (legal support) has 
been destroyed but the momentum of the institution’s vast historic and social weight 
nevertheless carries it forward for at least a while longer.  
 243. See supra Part III. 
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make such a denial; the whole body of laws reinforcing the man-
woman meaning and sustaining the social institution is protective of 
the right. Surprisingly, only the California majority opinion 
attempted to defend redefinition in relation to the child’s bonding 
right.244 The Connecticut and Iowa opinions assert generally—as 
already mentioned—that redefinition will not work any appreciable 
harm on the institution of marriage, but these opinions do not 
address the child’s bonding right.245 The California majority, 
however, does recognize the concern that genderless marriage would 
“sever the link . . . between procreation and child rearing and would 
‘send a message’ to the public that it is immaterial to the state 
whether children are raised by their biological mother and father.”246 
Although it notes that it “appreciate[s] the genuine concern for the 
well-being of children,” the court ultimately “conclude[s]” that this 
assertion “lacks merit.” 247 It explains: 
Our recognition that the core substantive rights encompassed by 
the constitutional right to marry apply to same-sex as well as 
opposite-sex couples does not imply in any way that it is 
unimportant or immaterial to the state whether a child is raised by 
his or her biological mother and father. By recognizing this 
circumstance we do not alter or diminish either the legal 
responsibilities that biological parents owe to their children or the 
substantial incentives that the state provides to a child’s biological 
parents to enter into and raise their child in a stable, long-term 
committed relationship. Instead, such an interpretation of the 
constitutional right to marry simply confirms that a stable two-
parent family relationship, supported by the state’s official 
recognition and protection, is equally as important for the 
numerous children in California who are being raised by same-sex 
couples as for those children being raised by opposite-sex couples 
(whether they are biological parents or adoptive parents). This 
interpretation also guarantees individuals who are in a same-sex 
relationship, and who are raising children, the opportunity to 
obtain from the state the official recognition and support accorded 
a family by agreeing to take on the substantial and long-term 
 
 244. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432–33 (Cal. 2008). 
 245. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 246. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 432. 
 247. Id. at 433.  
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mutual obligations and responsibilities that are an essential and 
inseparable part of a family relationship.248 
This analysis is deeply flawed. It launches from the unproven 
premise that no productive nexus exists between the man-woman 
marriage institution and the child’s bonding right. Because the falsity 
of that fundamental premise has already been demonstrated, what is 
important here is to show that this is a fundamental premise of the 
California majority opinion. We proceed sentence by sentence, with 
the reminder that what is said of marriage in California most 
definitely also applies to marriage in Connecticut, Iowa, and across 
America. 
The first sentences asserts that  
Our recognition that the core substantive rights encompassed by 
the constitutional right to marry apply to same-sex as well as 
opposite-sex couples does not imply in any way that it is 
unimportant or immaterial to the state whether a child is raised by 
his or her biological mother and father.249  
The opening phrase down to “opposite-sex couples” is a euphemism 
for “our act of redefining marriage.” The California majority opinion 
is saying that the act of redefining marriage does not deny the state’s 
interest in the child’s bonding right. Yet the act of redefining 
marriage unmakes the very social institution the existence and vitality 
of which stand as the essential provider and protector of that right. 
Thus, to say that to unmake that institution is not to “deny” the 
state’s interest in that right is to say something beyond nonsensical; 
to say that is to engage in the evil of Orwellian double-speak. 
The court continues: “By recognizing this circumstance we do 
not alter or diminish either the legal responsibilities that biological 
parents owe to their children or the substantial incentives that the 
state provides to a child’s biological parents to enter into and raise 
their child in a stable, long-term committed relationship.”250 What 
“this circumstance” refers to is unclear; it is probably referring to the 
new circumstance that, because of redefinition, same-sex couples can 
now marry. If so, it is true, as the California majority opinion says, 
that redefinition “does not alter or diminish . . . the legal 
responsibilities that biological parents owe to their children.” But the 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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narrow scope of those “legal responsibilities” should not be 
overlooked. In California, a biological parent’s only specifically 
enforceable legal responsibility is financial support.251 California 
compels no unable or adamantly unwilling parent to supervise, 
protect, or otherwise care for his or her child, for the simple reason 
that to do so would be contrary to the best interests of the child.252 
There are indeed “natural limits on what parents can be ‘made’ to 
do,”253 and “[m]uch of what family members . . . ‘owe’ one another 
cannot be enforced in a court of law . . . .”254 So the reference to “no 
diminution in legal responsibilities” is a mirage. That reference 
evades the question of legal protection, or not, for the social 
predicate to the child’s bonding right, the man-woman marriage 
institution.  
In contrast, to enshrine genderless marriage is to say something 
very important about protection, or not, of the child’s bonding 
right. In a very practical way, redefinition withdraws that 
protection,255 and that is to “alter” and “diminish” indeed. 
The California majority opinion commits an even more serious 
error of analysis when it asserts that redefinition does “not alter or 
diminish . . . the substantial incentives that the state provides to a 
child’s biological parents to enter into and raise their child in a 
stable, long-term committed relationship.”256 Far and away the most 
powerful “incentive” any parent has to nurture and rear his child is 
within; it is the sense or the understanding that he ought, as a matter 
of the quality of his own humanity, to do so and that, if he does not, 
he will be (or will be seen to be) a less worthy person. Where it 
 
 251. See, e.g., County of Yolo v. Francis, 224 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“Federal law requires that states enforce parental support obligations or face a reduction in 
federal funding of their AFDC programs. . . . ‘[T]he primary reason underlying the public 
enforcement of support rights is to insure that the monies disbursed by the county for aid of a 
needy child be returned to the public source from which they were disbursed.’”). 
 252. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2006). This section provides that a child 
may be adjudged to be a dependent child of the court if the child comes within any of the 
descriptions set forth in its subsections (a) through (j). Subsections (b), (c), (g), and (h) 
address, in one context or another, the unwilling parent. The overall intent of the dependency 
scheme is to protect children from abuse or neglect and to provide permanent, stable homes if 
those children cannot be returned home within a set period of time. See In re Celine R., 71 
P.3d 787, 791–92 (Cal. 2003).  
 253. Hafen, supra note 98, at 473. 
 254. Id. at 476. 
 255. See supra notes 222–224 and accompanying text. 
 256. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433 (Cal. 2008). 
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exists, that inner sense is the product of socialization.257 It is the 
product of at least one social institution’s teaching, forming, and 
transforming power. It is the fruit of the individual’s positive 
response to a strong social norm. Thus, “[d]espite the natural limits 
on what parents can be ‘made’ to do, the conditions that optimize ‘a 
home environment which enables [a child] to develop into a mature 
and responsible adult’ are clearly encouraged by cultural patterns and 
reinforced by legal expectations,”258 that is, the cultural patterns and 
legal expectations historically embedded in the man-woman marriage 
institution. Accordingly, it seems fair to say that in our society the 
man-woman marriage institution has played an important role in the 
creation of that inner sense of parental duty. Surely that institution 
does much, along with other socializing influences, to generate the 
duty of a man and a woman not to abandon, sell, give away, or leave 
their child to the state. To fulfill that duty is a promise that, across 
cultures, the man and the woman make in a public way when they 
marry.259  
 
 257. See Hafen, supra note 98, at 476–79 (speaking of “socialization” as the source of 
“obedience to the unenforceable”). 
 258. Id. at 473. 
 259. A recent review of government efforts to strengthen marriage notes this link 
between the strength of the institution and the personal sense of parental duty: “[W]hen an 
externalized culture is actively supportive of an internalized individual sense of obligation to 
perform what one has promised in one’s marriage vows, we see the possibility of a substantially 
stronger institution of marriage that supports the well-being of children, women, and men.” Alan 
Hawkins et al., Recent Government Reforms Related to Marital Formation, Maintenance, and 
Dissolution in the United States: A Primer and Critical Review, 8 J. COUPLE & RELATIONSHIP 
THERAPY 264, 277–78 (2009). Parental duty is part of the “template” provided by marriage that 
Steven Nock described: 
The institutional perspective argues that marriage changes individuals in positive 
ways, both to the extent that others treat them differently and to the extent that 
they come to view themselves differently. The marital relationship carries with it 
legal, moral, and conventional assumptions about what is right and proper. It is, in 
other words, institutionalized and defined by social norms. It is culturally patterned 
and integrated into other basic social institutions like education, the economy, and 
politics. In this sense, married individuals have a tradition of solutions to rely on 
when they confront problems. For many matters in domestic life, marriage supplies a 
template. 
…. 
[The ideology underlying that template historically] associated the prevailing family 
principles of marriage, childbearing, motherhood, commitment, and sacrifice for family 
with a sense of sacredness. It stressed sexual fidelity in marriage, chastity before 
marriage, intensive child-rearing, a commitment to a lifelong marriage, and high levels 
of expressive interaction among family members. 
Steven L. Nock, Marriage as a Public Issue, 15 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 13, 18–19, 22 
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In contrast, every married same-sex couple with legal rights to a 
child conceived with assisted reproductive technologies becomes the 
genderless marriage regime’s clear announcement that such 
abandonment by at least one biological parent, without careful and 
independent consideration of the best interests of the child, is legally, 
and therefore socially, acceptable.260 So the California majority 
opinion’s assertion that redefinition does not diminish the 
“incentives” to fulfillment of parental duties is plainly wrong. 
Redefinition unmakes the very social institution productive of the 
most powerful incentives and replaces it with a radically different 
marriage regime teaching a radically different message. 
One other aspect of this assertion merits attention. The assertion 
speaks of parental obligations and of the state’s interests in assuring 
fulfillment of those obligations. But nowhere is there a reference to 
any rights or interests of the child relative to the child’s connection 
with biological parents. This silence is telling and troublesome. 
Professor Baker’s brilliant analysis of bionormativity—that is, of the 
norm that parental rights and obligations align with biological 
parenthood—teaches that the interests served by that norm must be 
analyzed separately for the state, parents, and children.261 Children’s 
interests in bionormativity differ from the state’s and from parents’; 
children “seem to have what is potentially the strongest interest in the 
biology of biological parenthood.”262 Professor Baker explains that this 
may be because there are “psychological benefits associated with being 
raised by one’s biological parents.”263 These considerations are 
luminous of some of the deep roots of the child’s bonding right in our 
domestic and international legal regimes. It is after all the child’s 
bonding right, a fact that the majority opinion never addresses. Of 
course, however, the majority opinion cannot acknowledge that the 
right at issue belongs to children, particularly those of future 
 
(2005) (emphasis added). 
 260. See COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE (ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, PRINCIPAL 
INVESTIGATOR), THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH 
BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S NEEDS 32 (2006), available at 
http://www.marriagedebate.com/reg/pdf_secure.php?pdf=5 (requires login) (“The 
legalization of same-sex marriage, while sometimes seen as a small change affecting just a few 
people, raises the startling prospect of fundamentally breaking the legal institution of marriage 
from any ties to biological parenthood.”)  
 261. Baker, supra note 224, at 682. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 686. 
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generations, without sabotaging its own no-downside argument. That 
is because redefinition is such a blow to bionormativity and to the laws 
protective of that norm and therefore to the child’s bonding right 
made meaningful by it. 
The California court proceeds to assert that  
Instead, such an interpretation of the constitutional right to marry 
simply confirms that a stable two-parent family relationship, 
supported by the state’s official recognition and protection, is 
equally as important for the numerous children in California who 
are being raised by same-sex couples as for those children being 
raised by opposite-sex couples (whether they are biological parents 
or adoptive parents).264  
“[S]uch an interpretation” refers, of course, to redefinition. The 
error in this sentence resides in the word “simply.” The no-downside 
argument requires that redefinition “simply” or only confirm the 
value of stable homes for all children. But it does not do “simply” or 
only that. Redefinition has a dark, destructive side that suppresses 
the now-institutionalized man-woman meaning and thereby 
unmakes the social institution essential for the child’s bonding right 
to be not just meaningful but also comprehensible. This sentence 
also contains another analytical error, but that error is best addressed 
in the context of the majority opinion’s next sentence. 
Before proceeding, however, it is worth noting similar assertions 
made in the Connecticut and Iowa opinions. The Connecticut 
opinion states:  
Both [same sex and opposite sex couples] consist of pairs of 
individuals who wish to enter into a formal, legally binding and 
officially recognized, long-term family relationship that affords the 
same rights and privileges and imposes the same obligations and 
responsibilities. Under these circumstances, there is no question 
but that these two categories of individuals are sufficiently similar 
to bring into play equal protection principles . . . .265 
In the Iowa opinion: 
Official recognition of [same-sex couples’] status provides an 
institutional basis for defining their fundamental relational rights 
 
 264. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis added).  
 265. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424 (Conn. 2008) (quoting 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 831 n.54). 
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and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples. Society 
benefits, for example, from providing same-sex couples a stable 
framework within which to raise their children and the power to 
make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it 
does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.266 
The Connecticut opinion elsewhere affirmed its desire to provide to 
children of same-sex couples, through redefinition, certain benefits 
not currently enjoyed, inasmuch as “[e]xcluding same-sex couples 
from civil marriage . . . prevent[s] children of same-sex couples from 
enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance 
of a stable family structure in which children will be reared, 
educated, and socialized.”267 Thus, what we say in the following 
paragraphs about the California majority opinion applies not just to 
it but to all three opinions.  
The California majority opinion next says: 
This interpretation also guarantees individuals who are in a same-
sex relationship, and who are raising children, the opportunity to 
obtain from the state the official recognition and support accorded 
a family by agreeing to take on the substantial and long-term 
mutual obligations and responsibilities that are an essential and 
inseparable part of a family relationship.268  
For purposes of the no-downside argument, this analysis fails because 
it evades the fact that government engages in two different child 
welfare endeavors; this analysis addresses only the endeavor 
congenial to a no-downside conclusion while ignoring the endeavor 
fatal to that conclusion.  
As discussed, a number of the unique social goods provided by 
the institutionalized man-woman meaning focus on the welfare of 
children, including the child’s bonding right. Man-woman marriage 
is thus often understood (and accurately so) as primarily a child-
centered and child-protective institution.269 Accordingly, government 
efforts to preserve that institution are child welfare endeavors, as has 
also already been discussed, though the point bears repetition. In 
 
 266. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).  
 267. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 474–75 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).  
 268. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 433. 
 269. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 21, at 12–13; BLANKENHORN, 
supra note 74, at 91, 99–105. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/4/2012 9:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
256 
contemporary America, the government thus engages in two 
fundamental child-welfare endeavors. In the first endeavor, the 
government protects marriage as an institution both by using the law 
to protect its core man-woman meaning and the pro-child social 
goods associated with that meaning. In the second, the government 
provides public assistance “through protective laws, access to 
resources, material resources . . . to individual children or their 
caregivers.”270 Reflection suggests that these two different 
governmental child welfare endeavors are just that, different. The 
former entails the protection, sustenance, and perpetuation of a 
social institution because that institution is good for children 
generally through the generations; the latter entails the present 
provision to each child, regardless of the child’s circumstances, of 
those resources that society deems minimally due to every child. By 
engaging in both endeavors simultaneously, government attempts to 
maximize the well-being of all children, both those now among us 
and those of future generations. 
The California majority opinion ignores the institutionally 
protective nature of the first endeavor, which seeks to preserve the 
man-woman meaning. Instead, it speaks only in the language of the 
second endeavor, which seeks to provide at least minimal resources 
to every child; hence, this language: that a parental unit caring for 
children should be “supported by the state’s official recognition and 
protection” and have “the opportunity to obtain from the state the 
official recognition and support accorded a family.”271 Such an 
approach cultivates an ethos of government-assured equality of 
circumstances for all children, but because it ignores the preeminent 
government child-welfare endeavor it is intellectually indefensible.  
In short, the nature and value of the child’s bonding right are 
fatal to the three opinions’ no-downside argument. That argument 
fails because the opinions construct the argument on a false 
fundamental premise—that no productive nexus exists between the 
man-woman marriage institution and the child’s bonding right. 
4. Husband and wife 
Just as it is with the child’s bonding right, so it is with the 
statuses and identities of husband and wife: without reasonable 
 
 270. See Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 359. 
 271. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 433. 
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dispute, they are the product of the man-woman meaning at the core 
of the marriage institution. Those statuses and identities also qualify 
as valuable social goods, both for individuals and for society. To use 
Dworkin’s description, husband “is a distinct mode of association 
and commitment that carries centuries and volumes of social and 
personal meaning.”272 So is wife, and each of those two statuses exists 
in association with and by reference to the other. The thick, deep 
meanings of husband pertain to relationship with wife (and vice 
versa) and, relative to that relationship, shape and inform a wide 
range of projects, purposes, and possibilities.273 As one consequence 
of this, “marriage has always been the central cultural site of male-
female relations”274 and society’s primary and most effective means of 
bridging the male-female divide—that “massive cultural effort of 
every human society at all times and in all places.”275 And despite 
issues relative to selection and causation factors, it is clear that those 
who enjoy the status and identity of husband or wife are healthier, 
wealthier, and happier than those who do not.276 
In contrast, to the extent (which may be very small indeed) that 
a genderless-marriage regime even allows the words husband and 
wife, it shrivels their meanings all the way down to a mere biological 
description. Indeed, it is fair to say that, in a genderless-marriage 
regime, husband means “a marriage partner with a penis”; wife, “a 
marriage partner with a vagina.” Such a regime must jettison and 
suppress the “centuries and volumes of social and personal 
meaning”277 inhering in those words because, to the extent it does 
not, it is reinforcing the man-woman meaning of marriage, and that 
is something a genderless-marriage regime cannot do without 
jeopardizing its own supremacy and perpetuation.278 Remember, a 
 
 272. DWORKIN, supra note 175, at 86. 
 273. See DeCoste, supra note 73, at 625–26. 
 274. Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 74, at 14. 
 275. Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in 
DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 74, at 43. 
 276. See, e.g., Nock, supra note 259, at 17 (“The accumulated research shows that 
married people are typically healthier, live longer, earn more, have better mental health, have 
better sex lives, and are happier than their unmarried counterparts.”). See id. at 18–21, where 
Nock addresses the selection and causation factors. 
 277. DWORKIN, supra note 175, at 86. 
 278. The California majority opinion itself makes clear that the statuses and identities of 
husband and wife are hallmarks of the man-woman marriage institution and that to speak of 
husband or wife is to acknowledge the man-woman meaning in marriage. See In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 407–09 (Cal. 2008).  
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society can have only one marriage institution at a time, either one 
constituted by the man-woman meaning or the alternative 
constituted by the any-two-persons meaning.279 Moreover, because it 
must of necessity limit husband and wife to mere biological 
description, a genderless marriage regime simply cannot perform in 
this context the fundamental task of any valuable social institution—
empowering and enabling people to do and become what they could 
not do and become without the institution.280 
These understandings lead to an “other side of the coin” reality 
of profound importance. Section III.B.2.b, which discussed access 
for same-sex couples into the marriage institution, asserted the twin 
social realities that (1) in response to redefinition the law can and 
will suppress the man-woman meaning and thereby unmake the 
man-woman marriage institution and (2) the law has no power to 
usher same-sex couples into the institution “traditionally designated 
as marriage”281 but only the power to usher them into a post-
political, law-constructed, genderless marriage regime. Relative to 
those realities, the earlier section focused on consequences for same-
sex couples. What these realities mean for man-woman couples is the 
other side of the coin. For man-woman couples, these realities mean 
that no matter how much man-woman couples might desire the 
man-woman marriage institution’s unique social goods, they cannot 
have them because the law has unmade—deinstitutionalized—that 
institution. Yes, they can marry, but the point is what the straight 
men and women will be marrying “into.” They will be marrying into 
a much different social institution than their parents married into 
simply because, undeniably, a constitutive core meaning will be 
radically different.  
Moreover, by marrying they will be reinforcing the new regime. 
Social institutions are renewed and strengthened by use consistent 
with the shared public meanings constituting them.282 “[E]ach use of 
the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution. Cars and 
shirts wear out as we use them but constant use renews and 
strengthens institutions such as marriage. . . .”283 After redefinition, 
 
 279. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 280. See DeCoste, supra note 73, at 625–27; see also Monte Neil Stewart, Dworkin, 
Marriage, Meanings – and New Jersey, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 302–05 (2007).  
 281. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399. 
 282. See SEARLE, supra note 118, at 57. 
 283. Id. 
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every use of the new institution by a man-woman couple will validate 
and reinforce it; after all, that couple will be invoking on their union 
the sanctioning power of a polity that rigorously views their union as 
one between “two persons.” Because those “two persons” happen to 
be a man and a woman, the consequences may initially be 
misunderstood by many or even most,284 but the strengthening effect 
on the new institution is largely unavoidable. We use the word 
“largely” advisedly. In a genderless marriage regime, such as in 
Canada or Massachusetts, a man and a woman desiring to avoid 
complicity with the new institutional regime could fulfill that 
desire—but only by openly participating in a decidedly exclusive 
marriage ceremony sanctioned only by a decidedly exclusive norm 
community—in other words, by openly foregoing civilly sanctioned 
genderless marriage by means of a consciously political act. The price 
for doing so includes forfeiting the benefits of civil marriage and 
being officially labeled as bigoted (or at least “discriminatory”)—that 
is, as hostile to the constitutional ideal of equality.  
All these consequences for conscientious man-woman couples 
make the California majority opinion’s conclusions seem remarkable. 
It concludes that constitutional law imposes on the state the 
affirmative obligation to recognize and sustain the marriage 
institution; in other words, it is constitutionally impermissible for a 
state “to get out of the marriage business.” The key language merits 
quotation in full:  
If civil marriage were an institution whose only role was to serve the 
interests of society, it reasonably could be asserted that the state 
should have full authority to decide whether to establish or abolish 
the institution of marriage (and any similar institution, such as 
domestic partnership). In recognizing, however, that the right to 
marry is a basic, constitutionally protected civil right—”a 
fundamental right of free men [and women]”—the governing 
California cases establish that this right embodies fundamental 
interests of an individual that are protected from abrogation or 
elimination by the state. Because our cases make clear that the right 
 
 284. A common error is to confuse the social institution, a complex web of widely shared 
public meanings, with the physical objects on which the institution operates. The very same 
train locomotive may have existed in Russia in 1915 and in 1925, but the same social 
institution of property most certainly did not. The train locomotive in 1915 was a subject of 
the social institution of private property; in 1925 it was the subject of the radically different 
social institution of communal property. The phenomenon is similar relative to George and 
Martha’s marriage before and after the genderless marriage revolution is fully implemented. 
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to marry is an integral component of an individual’s interest in 
personal autonomy protected by the privacy provision of [the 
California constitution] . . . and of the liberty interest protected by 
the due process clause of [the same] . . . , it is apparent under the 
California Constitution that the right to marry—like the right to 
establish a home and raise children—has independent substantive 
content, and cannot properly be understood as simply the right to 
enter into such a relationship if (but only if) the Legislature chooses 
to establish and retain it. (Accord, Poe v. Ullman (1961) 367 U.S. 
497, 553, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.) 
[“the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and 
accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which 
the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it 
has fostered and protected”]).  
One very important aspect of the substantive protection afforded 
by the California constitutional right to marry is, of course, an 
individual’s right to be free from undue governmental intrusion 
into (or interference with) integral features of this relationship—
that is, the right of marital or familial privacy. The substantive 
protection embodied in the constitutional right to marry, however, 
goes beyond what is sometimes characterized as simply a 
“negative” right insulating the couple’s relationship from 
overreaching governmental intrusion or interference, and includes a 
“positive” right to have the state take at least some affirmative 
action to acknowledge and support the family unit. 
. . . .  
[T]he right to marry does obligate the state to take affirmative 
action to grant official, public recognition to the couple’s 
relationship as a family, as well as to protect the core elements of 
the family relationship from at least some types of improper 
interference by others. This constitutional right also has the 
additional affirmative substantive effect of providing assurance to 
each member of the relationship that the government will enforce 
the mutual obligations between the partners (and to their children) 
that are an important aspect of the commitments upon which the 
relationship rests.285  
By the repeated references to the marriage institution, this 
language rather clearly makes three points: 
 
 285. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 425–27 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
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1. In fulfillment of an affirmative obligation constitutionally 
imposed on it, the state must sustain that marriage institution 
that “always and in every age it has fostered and protected”; it 
is constitutionally impermissible for the state to abolish that 
institution. 
 
2. This constitutional protection of the institution arises from 
the “fundamental interests of [the] individual” served by that 
institution; we are dealing with a personal right to ongoing 
state support of the marriage institution. (This conclusion is 
reinforced by the understanding, already addressed,286 that the 
right to marry is simply the right to enter into, and be an 
equal participant in, the institution of marriage.) 
 
3. This individual (or personal) right includes both the right “to 
be free from undue governmental intrusion into (or 
interference with) integral features of this relationship” made 
possible by the marriage institution and the right to have the 
state fulfill its affirmative obligation to sustain the institution. 
 
Yet in advancing these points, the California majority opinion has 
a large blind spot: the majority acts as if it is dealing with one and 
the same marriage institution, whether its core meaning is “the 
union of a man and a woman” or “the union of any two persons.” 
But the social reality is that the opinion is dealing with two radically 
different and mutually exclusive marriage institutions.287 So the key 
question becomes which of the two the state is constitutionally 
obligated to sustain, and the answer must be, on the California 
majority opinion’s own terms, the man-woman marriage institution. 
After all, that is the one that “always and in every age [the state] has 
fostered and protected” and that is the one that uniquely provides a 
number of valuable social goods and that empowers and enables 
people to do and become, in important respects, what they could 
not do and become without the institution. Moreover, the key 
precedents on which the majority opinion relies for its holding of “a 
constitutional right to marry” quite clearly address a personal right 
 
 286. See supra Part III.B.2.b.  
 287. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
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to enter the man-woman marriage institution; it is the right to enter 
that institution that is among “those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”288 
The California majority opinion’s blind spot is coextensive with 
another false fundamental premise. It is that a marriage institution or 
regime constituted by the core any-two-persons meaning is 
essentially the same as the man-woman marriage institution. Or, 
stated negatively, it is that the any-two-persons marriage regime and 
the man-woman marriage institution are not radically different and 
mutually exclusive. And on that false fundamental premise, all three 
opinions construct the no-downside argument detailed earlier, that 
permitting genderless marriage will not alter the institution of 
marriage or deprive man-woman couples of any rights they now 
enjoy.289 This is perhaps seen most clearly in the Iowa opinion, which 
states:  
While the institution of civil marriage likely encourages stability in 
opposite-sex relationships, we must evaluate whether excluding gay 
and lesbian people from civil marriage encourages stability in 
opposite-sex relationships. The County offers no reasons that it 
does, and we can find none. The stability of opposite-sex 
relationships is an important governmental interest, but the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is not substantially 
related to that objective.290 
Each of these arguments is founded on the fundamental premise 
that a marriage institution or regime constituted by the core any-
two-persons meaning is essentially the same as the man-woman 
marriage institution. It is not difficult to see how that no-downside 
argument fails. It fails exactly because “[o]pposite-sex couples will 
[not] continue to enjoy precisely the same constitutional rights they 
traditionally have possessed . . . .”291 Traditionally, man-woman 
couples had the constitutional right to enter into the man-woman 
marriage institution, enjoy its unique social goods, and be enabled 
and empowered by it to become what they could not become 
 
 288. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422 (quoting Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 
1948)). 
 289. Supra Part III.  
 290. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 (Iowa 2009) (emphasis added). 
 291. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 430. 
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without the institution, including husband and wife. Yet the 
unavoidable effect of redefinition is to (1) suppress the man-woman 
meaning and (2) thereby unmake the man-woman marriage 
institution, which (3) causes the loss of its unique social goods, 
including provision of the statuses and identities of husband and wife 
with their “distinct mode of association and commitment that carries 
centuries and volumes of social and personal meaning,” and (4) 
replaces all that with a radically different marriage regime hostile to, 
indeed destructive of, that particular “social and personal meaning.” 
Because of redefinition, now “[t]here are enough marriage licenses 
to go around for everyone”292 who wants to enter the genderless 
marriage regime and none at all for those desiring to enter, with 
state sanction, the man-woman marriage institution.293 
C. Loss of Religious Liberty as a Downside 
Proponents of man-woman marriage, especially those from faith 
communities that highly value the man-woman marriage institution, 
have asserted that legal redefinition of marriage will lead to loss of 
religious liberty and that this will constitute yet another downside of 
the redefinition project. The California, Connecticut, and Iowa 
opinions discuss religious liberty only briefly, employing the lines of 
the standard no-downside argument in this context, namely, that 
redefinition will not hurt religion because civil marriage and religious 
marriage are two separate and distinct phenomena. This subsection 
critically examines this aspect of the three opinions. 
The religious liberty issue was initially brought to the forefront 
by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund is the 
preeminent public-interest law firm in the nation relative to the 
 
 292. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 23 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 293. The California majority opinion makes clear, by the sources it cites, that the right to 
marry is a right guaranteed by both the state constitution and the federal constitution, 
although the state right and the federal right may not be coextensive. See Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 425–27 & nn.41–42. Because, as seen in the text, that right is a right to enter into the 
man-woman marriage institution, the California majority opinion gets things exactly wrong 
relative to the state constitutional right to marry. The federal courts, however, may get things 
exactly right relative to the federal constitutional right to marry, with large implications for the 
resolution of the marriage issue across the entire nation. But see Sunstein, supra note 188, at 
2084 (“[S]tates may abolish marriage without offending the [federal] Constitution . . . .”). 
Sunstein’s conclusion, however, is based on the narrowest of narrow descriptions of 
contemporary American marriage: “marriage is a government-operated licensing scheme, no 
less and no more.” Id. at 2086. Sunstein does not at all come to grips with the broad 
description of contemporary marriage and its factual accuracy.  
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defense of religious liberties, and it represents a wide range of 
churches and faith communities, some of which favor and some of 
which oppose the redefinition of marriage.294 In December 2005, the 
Becket Fund hosted a gathering of distinguished scholars, some 
favoring and some opposing redefinition.295 Those scholars 
considered the ways and the extent to which redefinition would 
affect religious liberties in the United States. At the risk of over-
simplifying these scholars’ deliberations, they can be summarized like 
this: Those opposed to redefinition concluded that redefinition 
would very much hurt American religious liberties, while those 
favoring redefinition concluded that it would very, very much hurt 
those liberties but this was an acceptable price to pay to advance the 
civil rights of gay men and lesbians.296 The issue of redefinition’s 
adverse impacts on religious liberties has been much and seriously 
debated since.297 The Becket Fund now files amicus briefs raising 
that religious-liberty issue in each appellate case considering the 
marriage issue,298 and did so in In re Marriage Cases, Kerrigan, and 
Varnum.299 
 
 294. See BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Our Mission, 
http://www.becketfund.org/our-mission/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 295. See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston: The Coming Conflict Between Same-Sex 
Marriage and Religious Liberty, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (May 15, 2006), available at 
http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/191kgwgh.asp.  
 296. Id. The papers presented at the conference are available at http:// 
www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/494.html.  
 297. See, e.g., Roger Severino, Or for Poorer: How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious 
Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007); Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, 
Does Recognition of the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry Impose Undue Burdens on People 
Who Reject Same-Sex Marriage on Account of Religious Convictions? An Evaluation of This 
Objection to the Massachusetts and California Same-Sex Marriage Decisions, FINDLAW (July 8, 
2008), available at http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20080801.html; 152 CONG. REC. 
S5422 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback): 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that same-sex marriage poses a significant threat 
to religious liberties. Scholars on both the left and the right agree that same-sex 
marriage has raised the specter of the massive and protracted battle over religious 
freedom. Where courts impose the same-sex marriage regime as a constitutionally 
guaranteed right, a multitude of new religious liberty conflicts will inevitably arise at 
every point where the law touches marriage and is applied to individuals, businesses, 
nonprofits, and even churches and synagogues. 
 298. The Becket Fund describes its amicus brief activity on its website at 
http://www.becketfund.org/category/cases/. 
 299. Application and Proposed Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting State Defendants, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) 
(No. S147999) [hereinafter California Becket Fund brief]; Brief for The Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
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As part of the thorough-going deployment of the no-downside 
argument, the three opinions address this religious-liberty issue, 
albeit briefly. Before examining that performance, however, two 
other aspects of the three opinions, consequential for the religious-
liberty issue, merit attention. First is the constant treatment of the 
redefinition-of-marriage endeavor as historically, legally, socially, and 
morally equivalent to earlier battles for the civil rights of blacks and 
women.300 Only once does the California majority opinion deviate 
 
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. 17716); Brief for The Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee, Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No. 07–1499). 
 300. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401–02, 430, 442–44, 445, 451. This “grand 
equivalence” strategy comes to the fore in the California majority opinion’s choice of the strict 
scrutiny standard of review, a standard historically reserved for “suspect classifications” based 
on race and, in California, gender. See id. at 442–44. Here is one example of the majority 
opinion’s deployment of that strategy: 
 Although the understanding of marriage as limited to a union of a man and a 
woman is undeniably the predominant one, if we have learned anything from the 
significant evolution in the prevailing societal views and official policies toward 
members of minority races and toward women over the past half-century, it is that 
even the most familiar and generally accepted of social practices and traditions often 
mask an unfairness and inequality that frequently is not recognized or appreciated by 
those not directly harmed by those practices or traditions. It is instructive to recall in 
this regard that the traditional, well-established legal rules and practices of our not-
so-distant past (1) barred interracial marriage, (2) upheld the routine exclusion of 
women from many occupations and official duties, and (3) considered the relegation 
of racial minorities to separate and assertedly equivalent public facilities and 
institutions as constitutionally equal treatment. As the United States Supreme Court 
observed in its decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the expansive and protective provisions 
of our constitutions, such as the due process clause, were drafted with the 
knowledge that “times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see 
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” For this 
reason, the interest in retaining a tradition that excludes an historically disfavored 
minority group from a status that is extended to all others—even when the tradition 
is long-standing and widely shared—does not necessarily represent a compelling 
state interest for purposes of equal protection analysis.  
Id. at 451(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).  
  The court in Kerrigan employed the same strategy in establishing an intermediate 
scrutiny level. See 957 A.2d at 412, 433, 444–45, 449 (legislative indicators of disfavored 
status). In addition, the Kerrigan court quoted the first half of the paragraph from Marriage 
Cases excerpt above to establish that its decision was just one among a long list of reputable 
expansions of rights. Id. at 481–82. After quoting the California majority opinion, Kerrigan 
made clear that it saw its current work as one more step toward equality: “Like these once 
prevalent views, our conventional understanding of marriage must yield to a more 
contemporary appreciation of the rights entitled to constitutional protection.” Id. at 482. In 
his dissent, Justice Zarella strongly disagreed with the grand equivalence strategy, stating that 
the majority’s error was primarily based on (1) assumptions surrounding the narrow definition 
of marriage, and (2) overemphasis on discrimination faced by gay persons. Id. at 515 (Zarella, 
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from that “grand equivalence” strategy, and that is when in a 
footnote it expressly declines to “suggest that the current marriage 
provisions were enacted with an invidious intent or purpose.”301 One 
similar disclaimer is also found in the Connecticut majority 
opinion.302 Otherwise, the redefinition project is cast as one more 
step in the expansion of human rights to previously disfavored 
groups, with this step being essentially no different from the earlier 
ones.303 
This “grand equivalence” strategy has the effect, if not the 
purpose, of framing and trumpeting the three messages 
communicated by a genderless marriage regime. The three 
interrelated messages are: (1) men and women are interchangeable, 
(2) children do not need a mother and a father, and (3) those who 
believe otherwise are bigoted.304 The “bigoted” message is 
unavoidable given the constant equation of the current cases with 
those cases that struck down anti-miscegenation laws: California’s 
Perez v. Sharp and the federal counterpart of Loving v. Virginia. 305 
 
J., dissenting).  
  The Iowa opinion outlined the history of the expansion of rights in Iowa, the court 
obviously priding itself on being a frontrunner in rights expansion: “These cases . . . reflect this 
court has, for the most part, been at the forefront in recognizing individuals’ civil rights. The 
path we have taken as a state has not been by accident, but has been navigated with the 
compass of equality firmly in hand, constructed with a pointer balanced carefully on the pivot 
of equal protection.” Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 877 n.4. 
 301. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452 n.73. 
 302. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 477 n.79. No such disclaimer is found in the Iowa opinion, 
and in fact that opinion leaves the reader with the strong impression that the exclusion of 
same-sex persons from traditional marriage arises solely from the animus held against these 
persons and their lifestyles. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 901, 904, 907.  
 303. See supra note 293. 
 304. The starkest judicial deployment of those three messages appears in the district 
court’s decision striking down on federal constitutional grounds California’s Proposition 8. 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 305. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
The California majority opinion references the Perez case by name 33 times. The Connecticut 
majority opinion references the Loving case by name five times, with substantial reliance on 
that case in no less than three instances. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 416, 473–74, 480, 481–82. 
Especially telling is the Connecticut majority opinion’s following language: 
[R]emoving the barrier to same sex marriage is no different than the action taken by 
the United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, when it invalidated laws 
barring marriage between persons of different races. Although it is true that 
authorizing same sex couples to marry represents a departure from the way marriage 
historically has been defined, the change would expand the right to marry without 
any adverse effect on those already free to exercise the right. 
Id. at 473–74 (citation omitted). 
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In Perez, in one of its finest achievements, the California Supreme 
Court became the first American appellate court to strike down as 
unconstitutional anti-miscegenation statutes, that is, laws limiting 
and prohibiting interracial marriages.306 Proponents of those laws 
sought to withhold from non-whites the full measure of their civil 
rights and human dignity by limiting their choice of partner when 
entering into the man-woman marriage institution. Those laws were 
clearly the product of a white supremacist ideology; they were 
expressions of racism, of bigotry.307 The equivalents in our day, one 
is to understand, are the laws sustaining the man-woman meaning of 
marriage and the proponents of those laws.308 
In tandem with the analogies made to discriminatory laws, the 
opinions assert that “religious sentiment” is what drives opposition 
to genderless marriage. Clearly, dangers lurk for religious liberty 
when a purported civil right clashes with religious beliefs and 
practices. After concluding, on the basis of the fundamental premises 
 
 306. See Perez, 198 P.2d 17; see also Monte Neil Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage 
and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 570–72. 
 307. Stewart & Duncan, supra note 306, at 567 (“The history of antimiscegengation 
laws in the United States shows their purpose to be the promotion of white supremacy.”). 
 308. Besides repeatedly referencing Perez by name, see supra note 299, the California 
majority opinion emphasizes the invidious discrimination and bigotry that case opposed. “The 
court in Perez rejected that demeaning and unsubstantiated characterization [i.e., “the alleged 
inferior nature of all non-Caucasian persons”], and found there was no justification for the 
racially discriminatory restriction on the right to marry.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 
428 n.45 (Cal. 2008). 
 [T]he antimiscegenation statutes at issue in those cases[Perez and Loving v. 
Virginia] plainly treated members of minority races differently from White persons, 
prohibiting only intermarriage that involved White persons in order to prevent (in 
the undisguised words of the defenders of the statute in Perez) “the Caucasian race 
from being contaminated by races whose members are by nature physically and 
mentally inferior to Caucasians.” . . . [S]ee also Loving . . . 388 U.S. at p. 11, (“The 
fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons 
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as 
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”). 
Id. at 437. By emphasizing the completely unjustified discrimination exhibited by the anti-
miscegenation statutes and citing them repeatedly as if to draw the comparison to laws 
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying, the California majority opinion evinced its belief 
that similar motivations stand behind both laws. Similarly, when the Connecticut majority 
opinion uses the miscegenation analogy, and states that the distinction drawn by the marriage 
laws is of the same nature, the implication is clear: “[r]ecognizing the right of an individual to 
marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex 
marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of a different 
race devalues the marriage of a person who marries someone of her own race.” Kerrigan, 957 
A.2d at 474 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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catalogued above, that no state interests justify exclusion of same-sex 
from civil marriage, the Iowa opinion said this: 
[U]nexpressed[] religious sentiment most likely motivates many, if 
not most, opponents of same-sex civil marriage and perhaps even 
shapes the views of those people who may accept gay and lesbian 
unions but find the notion of same-sex marriage unsettling. . . . 
Whether expressly or impliedly, much of society rejects same-sex 
marriage due to sincere, deeply ingrained—even fundamental—
religious belief.309 
The Iowa opinion also declares that “[t]he belief that the ‘sanctity of 
marriage’ would be undermined by the inclusion of gay and lesbian 
couples bears a striking conceptual resemblance to the expressed 
secular rationale for maintaining the tradition of marriage as a union 
between dual-gender couples, but better identifies the source of the 
opposition.”310 The accusation is not explicit, but as the Iowa 
opinion equates the “sanctity of marriage” with the “expressed 
secular rationale for maintaining the tradition of marriage,” the 
message is clear: the Iowa opinion states, and this seems to be 
another of its fundamental premises, that all the proffered secular 
justifications for preserving the man/woman institution of marriage 
are really based upon a set of fundamental beliefs that have no place 
in the public sphere. The Connecticut majority opinion is no less 
forceful in identifying the source of opposition against genderless 
marriage, 311 and the proposition likely runs in the minds of other 
courts favoring redefinition.  
 
 309. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009). 
 310. Id. 
 311. The Connecticut majority opinion’s identification of the source of discriminatory 
views against gay persons is even more blatant than its grand equivalence strategy. It asserts 
that “[t]he predominating purpose motivating the exclusion of gay persons from state-
recognized marriages is religious.” Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 433, 444–45 & 445 n.36 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). It also explains:  
That prejudice against gay persons is so widespread and so deep-seated is due, in 
large measure, to the fact that many people in our state and nation sincerely believe 
that homosexuality is morally reprehensible. Indeed, homosexuality is contrary to 
the teachings of more than a few religions. In its amicus brief submitted to this 
court, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, which represents “the interests . . . of 
religious persons and institutions that conscientiously object to treating [same] sex 
and [opposite] sex unions as moral equivalents,” notes that “many religious groups 
do not accept [a sexual relationship] among same sex couples as a matter of 
conscience” and that “probably [the] majority . . . [of] religious groups . . . oppose 
same sex marriage.” 
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If the only real basis for denying civil rights to a protected class 
really derives from religious beliefs, how can those beliefs withstand 
attack when placed in the arena of myriad laws that protect and 
privilege the newfound civil right? Upon the tails of such 
unequivocal condemnation of religious beliefs comes the 
understanding by many perceptive and religious Americans that, in 
the contest over the marriage issue, the proposition really on the 
table is that their religious faith is a form of bigotry.312 
The fate of that proposition matters. Our society treats harshly 
those perceived to be bigots and affords scant protection to the 
endeavors perceived to advance their bigotry. Bob Jones University v. 
United States313 is an instructive example. In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld, against claims based in the First 
Amendment’s free exercise of religion clause, IRS action stripping a 
private educational institution of its tax-exempt and charitable status 
because it prescribed and enforced racially discriminatory admissions 
standards on the basis of religious doctrine. Similar examples 
abound.314 Because they do, the list of religiously motivated activities 
likely to collide in some fashion with state choice and promotion of a 
genderless marriage regime, and with the corresponding state 
suppression of the man-woman meaning, is a long list indeed.315 
The second aspect of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa 
opinions consequential for the religious-liberty issue and thus 
meriting attention here is this: the opinions incorporate, with varying 
degrees of subtlety, the common argument of genderless marriage 
proponents that civil marriage and religious marriage are two 
separate and distinct phenomena in our society. Twice the California 
majority opinion uses these words: “in order to emphasize and clarify 
that this civil institution [of marriage] is distinct from the religious 
institution of marriage.”316 Then in a footnote to the phrase “the 
legal institution of civil marriage,” the California majority opinion 
 
Id. at 444–45 (footnote omitted). 
 312. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 295. 
 313.  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 314. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) 
(holding that landlord did not have First Amendment rights to deny housing to cohabitating 
unmarried couple). But see, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) 
(holding that a law school did not violate the First Amendment when it denied recognition to 
a Christian students’ group that refused membership to gays). 
 315. See Severino, supra note 297, at 957–79. 
 316. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400, 434 (Cal. 2008).  
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asserts, with its own emphasis, that “[f]rom the state’s inception, 
California law has treated the legal institution of civil marriage as 
distinct from religious marriage.”317 A quotation of long-standing 
California law follows and appears intended to prove that assertion 
but does not: “No contract of marriage, if otherwise duly made, shall 
be invalidated for want of conformity to the requirements of any 
religious sect.”318 That language is not probative of distinct marriage 
institutions (civil vs. religious) but only of the undisputed social 
reality that both the social institution of law and the social institution 
of religion interact with and influence yet another social institution, 
marriage.319 That language simply does not operate to deny “the 
singularity of our society’s marriage institution.”320 So again, we have 
an unproven assumption serving as a fundamental premise in the 
majority opinion, namely that there are in our society two distinct 
marriage institutions, one denominated civil marriage and the other 
denominated religious marriage.  
The Connecticut and Iowa opinions separate civil and religious 
marriage in a more subtle manner. The Connecticut majority 
opinion asserts that “religious autonomy is not threatened by 
recognizing the right of same sex couples to marry civilly,”321 and 
further develops the distinction by drawing a line between the “state 
sanctioned and state regulated institution” of marriage and “religious 
 
 317. Id. at 407 n.11. 
 318. CAL. FAM. CODE § 420(c) (West 2011). 
 319. See Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 361–64 for a more detailed 
discussion. 
 320. Id. at 362. The California majority opinion’s own language relative to this question 
of one- versus two-marriage institutions is wildly inconsistent. See, e.g., Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d at 402 (“excluding same-sex couples from the legal institution of marriage”); id. at 423 
(“Society is served by the institution of civil marriage in many ways.”); id. at 424 (“Although 
past California cases emphasize that marriage is an institution in which society as a whole has a 
vital interest . . . .”); id. at 431 (describing “the legal institution of civil marriage”); id. at 432 
(“[P]romoting and facilitating a stable environment for the procreation and raising of children 
is unquestionably one of the vitally important purposes underlying the institution of     
marriage. . . .”); id. at 445 (“denying such couples access to the established institution of 
marriage”); id. at 447 (“[T]hroughout this state’s history the Legislature . . . has effected 
numerous fundamental changes in the institution of marriage. . . .”). The common speech of 
the people is perhaps the best evidence regarding the singularity of our society’s marriage 
institution. Thus, one simply does not hear talk like this: “Honey, did you hear that David and 
Allison are getting civilly [or religiously] married.” “I do wish my boy, who is now 31, would 
settle down and get civilly [or religiously] married.” “This news of their divorce really comes as 
a shock. I thought they had such an exemplary civil [or religious] marriage.” 
 321. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 475 (Conn. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
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objections” to genderless marriage.322 The same undercurrent is seen 
in the Iowa opinion: “The only difference [after redefinition] is civil 
marriage will take on a new meaning” while “religious marriages 
celebrated in the future will have the same meaning as those 
celebrated in the past.”323 Of course, if religious beliefs and practices 
can be cleanly separated from the substance of civil marriage, then 
the no-downside argument in relation to religious liberty is much 
easier to swallow. Indeed, the language quoted above seems to be 
aimed directly at increasing the palatability of the no-downside 
argument. The success of that endeavor, however, depends upon the 
truth of this fundamental premise.  
Social institutional realities falsify quite thoroughly this 
fundamental premise. Although the institution of marriage is 
influenced by its interaction with other social institutions, such as 
law, private property, and religion, and “takes from each a certain 
hue,”324 the social science scholarship identifies marriage as a single 
institution.325 As Blankenhorn explains,  
No one denies that property and social status (and many other big 
realities as well) affect all spheres of human social life, from 
education to medicine to, yes, marriage. But what affects 
something is different from the thing itself. For almost all of 
humanity, marriage has always and in all places been “really” about 
the male-female sexual bond and the children that result from that 
bond.326 
However, regardless of these social institutional realities, the 
opinions use the fundamental premise that civil marriage and 
religious marriage are distinct as a necessary step in building their 
no-downside argument relative to religious liberty. Citing to the 
California constitution’s religious liberty provision, the California 
majority opinion asserts that allowing genderless marriage  
will not impinge upon the religious freedom of any religious 
organization, official, or any other person; no religion will be 
 
 322.  Id. 
 323. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (emphasis in original). 
 324. See Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 363. 
 325. For example, Professor Clayton identifies “at least five basic institutions”: (1) 
education; (2) economics, which in our society encompasses private property, money, and 
markets; (3) government, which encompasses the law; (4) family, which encompasses man-
woman marriage; and (5) religion. CLAYTON, supra note 62, at 22. 
 326. BLANKENHORN, supra note 74, at 55; see also SEARLE, supra note 118, at 32. 
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required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to 
same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to 
solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious 
beliefs.327  
The Connecticut opinion also declares, 
[R]eligious autonomy is not threatened by recognizing the right of 
same sex couples to marry civilly. Religious freedom will not be 
jeopardized by the marriage of same sex couples because religious 
organizations that oppose same sex marriage as irreconcilable with 
their beliefs will not be required to perform same sex marriages or 
otherwise to condone same sex marriage or relations.328 
Similarly, the Iowa majority opinion asserts that  
[r]eligious doctrine and views contrary to this principle of law [will 
be] unaffected, and people can continue to associate with the 
religion that best reflects their views. A religious denomination can 
still define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and a 
marriage ceremony performed by a minister, priest, rabbi, or other 
person ordained or designated as a leader of the person’s religious 
faith does not lose its meaning as a sacrament or other religious 
institution. The sanctity of all religious marriages celebrated in the 
future will have the same meaning as those celebrated in the past. 
The only difference is civil marriage will now take on a new 
meaning that reflects a more complete understanding of equal 
protection of the law.329  
 
 327. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451–52 (Cal. 2008). 
 328. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 475 (Conn. 2008). 
 329. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (emphasis in original). The 
Iowa opinion made clear that it thought that state constitutional provisions were sufficient to 
protect religious autonomy, while at the same time asserting that the separation of church and 
state all but required the court to mandate redefinition: 
We, of course, have a constitutional mandate to protect the free exercise of religion 
in Iowa, which includes the freedom of a religious organization to define marriages 
it solemnizes as unions between a man and a woman. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 3 
(“The general assembly shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion] . . . .”). This mission to protect religious freedom is consistent with our 
task to prevent government from endorsing any religious view. 
Id. at 905. As to the first assertion, that state constitutional provisions are sufficient to protect 
religious practices, the Iowa opinion makes no effort to support that assertion and does not 
address the serious problems religious autonomy may encounter, as detailed hereafter. The 
second assertion is difficult to take seriously given that the court on one hand asserts that civil 
and religious marriage are separate and distinct (implying that a change in the former will not 
affect the latter), but on the other hand states that it must not endorse a particular religious 
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This is a stunning argument. It is built entirely on the implicit 
notion that state constitutional protections are sufficient to protect 
religious liberties in the only realms where the forthcoming 
genderless marriage regime might collide with them—the 
formulation of “religious policies or practices” and the solemnization 
of marriage. That implicit notion, however, is unproven and qualifies 
as yet another fundamental premise of the California, Connecticut, 
and Iowa opinions. It cannot be gainsaid that the new marriage 
regime will jeopardize religious liberties in a whole host of other 
areas.330 The jeopardy includes litigation attacking religiously 
motivated policies and practices in employment (employment and 
anti-discrimination laws), housing (fair housing laws), public services 
and facilities (public accommodation laws), and even sermons and 
proselyting materials (hate-speech and hate-crimes laws).331 The 
jeopardy also includes the risk of losing tax-exempt status, exclusion 
from competition for government-funded social service contracts, 
exclusion from state-regulated and state-licensed service 
opportunities such as adoption services, and exclusion from 
government facilities and fora.332 As to those areas, the opinions are 
not only silent but also silent in a way suggesting the absence of any 
other imminent conflicts. This tactic is particularly remarkable not 
only because the Becket Fund brief brought those other areas to the 
courts’ attention but because of the high level of media attention 
paid to other instances of a genderless marriage regime treading 
heavily on religious liberties.  
One example is the Catholic Charities case in Massachusetts.333 
This Catholic sponsored and directed adoption entity had, for many 
decades, been uniquely successful in placing hard-to-place 
children.334 After the advent of Massachusetts’s genderless marriage 
regime, however, the state insisted that Catholic Charities, on pain of 
losing its license, serve same-sex couples seeking to adopt, even 
though other competent secular adoption entities were available to 
help them (including on referral by Catholic Charities).335 The 
 
view (implying that its change in the former will affect the latter). 
 330. See Severino, supra note 297, at 957–79. 
 331. See, e.g., California Becket Fund brief, supra note 299, at 7–17. 
 332. Id. at 17–26. 
 333. See Gallagher, supra note 295. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
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Catholic Church concluded that, in fidelity to its religious beliefs, it 
could not comply with the state’s demands; consequently, Catholic 
Charities ceased its adoption work.336  
In short, the no-downside argument relative to religious liberty, 
as employed by the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions, 
barely seeks respect and does not earn it. Although many of the 
imminent burdens on religious liberty and conscience can reasonably 
be foreseen, these opinions build their approach on a false 
fundamental premise and, in the process, give evidence that is 
suggestive of a certain willful blindness.  
If this Article has succeeded in sustaining its core propositions, 
then it has certainly established that preservation of the man-woman 
institution of marriage has much less to do with fundamental 
religious beliefs than the three opinions assert and everything to do 
with the preservation of social goods that are essential to the orderly 
functioning of society. The social goods discussed herein are of such 
compelling nature that they command official state support, even if 
religious belief happened to call for a different result. 
IV. THE MATERIALITY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES 
The fundamental premises examined above range from 
“probably false” to “certainly false.” Thus, at this point, the key 
question is whether the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions’ 
fundamental premises are material, that is, whether, but for those 
premises, judicial reasoning could lead to a holding that 
constitutional norms mandate a genderless marriage regime. The 
following analysis strongly supports the conclusion that the false 
fundamental premises are material; but for them, no line of judicial 
reasoning that is both logical and coherent can lead to a holding that 
man-woman marriage is unconstitutional. 
We begin with a listing of the falsified fundamental premises 
(FFP) and their verified antitheses (VA). 
 
 FFP: Contemporary American marriage is nothing more than 
what the “narrow description” depicts it to be. VA: The 
“broad description,” with its inclusion of a broad range of 
 
 336. Id. 
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social institutional realities, much more accurately depicts 
contemporary American marriage.337 
 
 FFP: The legal suppression of the man-woman meaning and 
its replacement with the any-two-persons meaning will leave 
the marriage institution just as healthy, robust, and productive 
as before. VA: Redefinition probably will lead, sooner rather 
than later, to a society with no normative marriage institution 
at all.338 
 
 FFP: By decreeing same-sex couples possessed of the 
constitutional right to marry, the law thereby ushers them 
into the institution “traditionally designated as marriage” 
because a marriage institution constituted by the core any-
two-persons meaning is essentially the same as the marriage 
institution constituted by the core man-woman meaning. VA: 
A genderless marriage regime is radically different from the 
man-woman marriage institution, and it could not be 
otherwise because the two different core meanings will both 
construct individuals and societies differently and play radically 
different, even conflicting, roles relative to valuable social 
goods historically provided by the marriage institution.339 
 
 FFP: No productive nexus exists between the man-woman 
marriage institution, on one hand, and the child’s bonding 
right, on the other hand. VA: The core man-woman meaning 
in the marriage institution is the essential social predicate for 
the child’s bonding right to be recognized and meaningful in 
the lives of children.340 
 
 FFP: Man-woman couples will lose nothing as a result of 
redefinition because a marriage institution or regime 
constituted by the core any-two-persons meaning is essentially 
the same as the man-woman marriage institution. VA: Exactly 
because the any-two-persons marriage regime and the man-
 
 337. See supra Part II. 
 338. See supra Part III.A. 
 339. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
 340. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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woman marriage institution are radically different and 
mutually exclusive, as a result of redefinition man-woman 
couples will lose immediately their historic (and 
constitutional) right to enter, with state sanction, into the 
man-woman marriage institution and thereafter their ability to 
enter into that institution at all—because it will no longer 
exist.341 
 
 FFP: In our society there are two distinct marriage 
institutions, one denominated civil marriage and the other 
denominated religious marriage. VA: Our society has one 
marriage institution; this is the reality even though the 
marriage institution interacts with other distinct social 
institutions—such as the law, private property, and religion—
and thereby takes from each a certain hue.342 
 
 FFP: State constitutional protections are sufficient to protect 
religious liberties only in the realms where the forthcoming 
genderless marriage regime might collide with them—the 
formulation of “religious policies or practices” and the 
solemnization of marriage. VA: The forthcoming genderless 
marriage regime will collide, and destructively so, with the 
religious liberties of faith communities and individuals across a 
wide range of social practices and endeavors.343 
 
The falsified fundamental premises found in the California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa opinions are all material to these opinions’ 
central argument—the no-downside argument. But for use of those 
premises, redefinition would stand undisguised as a legal project that 
will jeopardize many valuable social goods and other important 
interests, diminish others, and eliminate still others—and that is a 
large downside indeed. The question then becomes whether the no-
downside argument itself is essential to a judicial decision to mandate 
genderless marriage. One phenomenon strongly suggests that it is, 
and further analysis confirms this suggestion. 
 
 341. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 342. See supra Part III.C. 
 343. See supra Part III.C. 
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The suggestive phenomenon is that genderless marriage 
proponents uniformly advance the no-downside argument. That is 
certainly true of the American (and Canadian) appellate court 
opinions (majority, plurality, dissenting) favoring redefinition. 
Although the California majority opinion—and at times the 
Connecticut and Iowa opinions as well—deploy the no-downside 
argument more aggressively and thoroughly than any predecessor 
opinion,344 these opinions are not breaking new ground but rather 
are following a well-worn path. Now given (and it is a given) that 
among the ranks of genderless marriage proponents, including 
judges, are some of the brightest legal minds in the country, it seems 
only safe to conclude that keen legal intelligence, after rigorous 
engagement with the question, sees the no-downside argument as 
essential to the success of the redefinition project.345 Certainly, the 
literature is devoid of arguments that, despite quite certain heavy 
social costs, courts and legislatures should nevertheless redefine 
marriage. So the very ubiquity of the no-downside argument 
strongly suggests that the argument is indeed material to the 
redefinition project. 
Constitutional analysis confirms that the argument is material, 
and does so in a negative way. When these opinions’ falsified 
fundamental premises are set aside and replaced with their verified 
antitheses, man-woman marriage is seen to withstand all 
constitutional attacks, regardless of the judicial standard of review 
used.  
That analysis proceeds like this: The man-woman meaning at the 
core and constitutive of the contemporary American marriage 
institution is materially productive of a number of valuable social 
goods. Those include the child’s bonding right, increased private 
welfare for the children (the vast majority) conceived by heterosexual 
intercourse, and provision of the deep, rich statuses and identities of 
husband and wife. The law has the power to suppress the man-
woman meaning, that is, to unmake (deinstitutionalize) the man-
woman marriage institution. When the law exercises that power 
rigorously and effectively, it results in diminution and loss of the 
 
 344. See supra Part III. 
 345. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 n.25 (Iowa 2009) (“The 
preservation of traditional marriage could only be a legitimate reason for the classification if 
expanding marriage to include others in its definition would undermine the traditional 
institution.”). 
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now-institutionalized man-woman meaning’s valuable social goods. 
The law does just that when it opts for a genderless marriage regime 
over the man-woman marriage institution; those two institutions are 
radically different and mutually exclusive. Moreover, the competing 
any-two-persons meaning does not cause loss of valuable social 
goods only by displacing the man-woman meaning, but also by 
affirmatively retracting such goods, most especially the child’s 
bonding right and the rich, deep statuses and identities of husband 
and wife. Thus, the laws now sustaining the man-woman meaning in 
marriage are well calculated to serve compelling societal (and, hence, 
governmental) interests, that is, to preserve and perpetuate the 
valuable social goods historically provided by the marriage 
institution. Consequently, even when subjected to the “strict 
scrutiny” standard of review, those laws must be deemed 
constitutional.346 
In sum, but for the California, Connecticut, and Iowa opinions’ 
falsified fundamental premises, no line of judicial reasoning can lead 
logically and coherently to the holding that constitutional norms 
require the redefinition of marriage.  
V. CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL COMPETENCE 
AND HONESTY 
The judicial performance reflected in these opinions falls well 
below minimally acceptable standards. The assessment of that 
performance could not be otherwise; the opinions rely repeatedly on 
demonstrably false fundamental premises and, but for that reliance, 
could not have reached their profoundly consequential decisions. So 
the opinions are riddled with material errors of judicial analysis. 
Beyond the matter of errors, there are also questions of 
intellectual competence and honesty. Both those questions, it seems, 
turn on availability to and actual awareness by the courts of the social 
institutional argument for man-woman marriage and the factual 
foundation of that argument. It is that factual foundation that 
provides the verified antitheses to the falsified fundamental premises 
(and, indeed, falsifies those premises), and it is that argument that 
connects the facts to the conclusion of compelling governmental 
 
 346. See discussion in Stewart, Marriage Facts, supra note 19, at 364–68. 
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interests and, hence, of the constitutionality of man-woman 
marriage.347  
Each of the California, Connecticut, and Iowa supreme courts 
had full access to the social institutional argument for man-woman 
marriage and its factual foundation. These were before the courts in 
briefs,348 in cited journal articles and books,349 and in other judicial 
opinions addressing the marriage issue.350 The opinions’ non-
engagement with the argument and its factual foundation, in light of 
their relevance to the opinions’ own fundamental premises, rather 
plainly cannot qualify as a minimally competent judicial performance. 
The level of negligence in that nonengagement is akin to the 
negligence of a motorist who drives through a well-functioning red 
light on a clear day, causes a serious wreck, and then asserts that he 
did not see the traffic signal. 
The respective opinions are guilty of intellectual dishonesty if 
their authors were in fact aware of the red light, apprehended its 
meaning, but nevertheless elected to proceed as if the red light did 
not exist—and did so because that was the only way to get where 
they were intent on going. There are obvious limits on our ability to 
 
 347. Although once the facts are adequately apprehended, that connection is virtually 
self-evident. 
 348. E.g., Application for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief and Amici Curiae Brief of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, California Catholic Conference, National 
Association of Evangelicals, and Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America in 
Support of Respondent State of California, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) 
(No. S147999); Application for Permission to File Amici Curiae Brief and Amici Curiae Brief 
of United Families International, Family Watch International, and Family Leader Foundation 
in Support of Respondent State of California, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) 
(No. S147999); Brief Amicus Curiae of United Families Connecticut in Support of 
Defendants-Appellees, Kerrigan v. Comm’n of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (No. 
17716); Brief of Amici Curiae United Families International, Family Watch International, and 
Family Leader Foundation in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862 (Iowa 2009) (No. CV 5965). 
 349. E.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 74 (cited by the California majority opinion at 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431, 432); Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public 
Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002) (cited by the California majority opinion 
at Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 433). Such citations are not easily found in the Connecticut 
and Iowa opinions, though this does not mean that the justices were not aware of the relevant 
materials. To the contrary, given the many citations to such literature found in the briefs 
before these courts, and their otherwise intimate acquaintance with the California majority 
opinion, it is nearly impossible to conclude that those courts were not aware of the social 
institutional argument as it is described in the relevant literature.  
 350. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 983 (Mass. 2003) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(Parrillo, J., concurring). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/4/2012 9:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
280 
know such things. What we can know for sure, however, is that a 
majority of three respected state supreme courts otherwise observant 
of the standards of intellectual honesty drove through a well-
functioning red light on a clear day. 
